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A study of the problems confronting the United States alliance 
systems is important because of the security value Americans have placed 
upon their allies. The security of the United States, to a large degree, 
is directly related to the dependence the Americans have placed upon their 
allies. Problems within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are of 
such a consequence that the effectiveness of the alliance is now in 
jeopardy; perhaps the alliance will lose its force because of the fail-
ure of the members to reconcile their differences. It is my belief that 
the United States, to insure the continuance of NATO, will have to adjust 
its policies to meet many of the problems that exist among alliance 
members. 
I wish to thank Dr. Clifford A. L. Rich, Head, Department of Polit-
ical Science for his scholarly critiques of this thesis during its devel-
opmental stage and also for his cooperation which was prevalent through-
out all stages of my graduate program. A debt is owed to Professor 
Harold V. Sare, Political Science Department, for his unselfish donations 
of time and energies in assisting me in all stages of the study. 
Lastly, appreciation is extended to Mrs. June Webb for the profes-
sional assistance offered in preparing all drafts and the final copy of 
this thesis. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1949 Western Europe was economically and militarily prostrate, 
but its potentiality for economic reconstruction and military development 
was readily apparent. Because the United States had emerged from the re-
cent war with a strong economy and an unchallenged nuclear capability, 
Western Europe had to depend upon her for much economic and military as-
sistance and support. This dependence elevated the United States to a 
dominant position in European affairs. Under the leadership of the 
United States, Western Europe and America joined in an alliance under 
the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in 1949. 
On the basis of this treaty the signatory nations, upon the urgings 
of the United States, worked toward the creation of a military deterrent1 
in the form of a tightly integrated multinational military establishment 
characterized by an efficient unity of command. The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organiz.ation (NATO) was the embodiment of this design. 
The United States has remained the principal force in the Organi-
zation, providing most of the top leadership and supplying a substantial 
amount of men and equipment. However, the United States has also been 
1Deterrent force can be defined as military forces, the purpose of 
which is to dissuade a government from committing a hostile act (in the 
eyes of the deterring states) by virtue of its fear of the consequences 
of military counteraction. Although a deterrent force's primary func-
tion is to deter, should it fail in that task, then its function becomes 
one of fighting. 
1 
2 
one of the beneficiaries of NATO accomplishments since the alliance has 
constituted a vital deterrent to any aggression against one or all of 
its members, including the United States. Viewed by the United States, 
NATO, as structured in the early 1950s, continues to serve that role. 
It is for this reason that the United States government insists that the 
organization not be modified. President Johnson recently expressed the 
commitment in these words: 
For nearly two decades this Alliance has assured the 
peace and security of the North Atlantic area. It has great-
ly reinforced stability throughout the world. 
The Alliance, in our view, reflects two important prop-
ositions. The first is that if war should come to the Atlantic 
area we must fight together--and fight effectively. The second 
is that if we act together for the common interest during peace 
war will not come. 2 
While the United States continues to value the Organization, Western 
European members have grown restless with it. They are not as strongly 
influenced by the policies of the United States today as they were in 
1949. For several reasons their attitudes toward the United States' 
leadership in NATO have changed. In the first place, postwa~ economic 
recovery has made Western Europe virtually independent of the United 
States, economically. This recovery has contributed to Western Europe's 
political independence. Next, the development of effective Soviet 
nuclear forces has cast a large shadow of doubt on the credibility of 
American retaliation in response to possible Soviet aggression in West-
ern Europe. Further, the shift of Soviet policy from the postwar Stalin-
ist challenge to a less tense policy of "peaceful coexistence" has caused 
Western Europeans to ponder whether NATO is as vital as it once was . 
2 Lyndon Johnson, "President Johnson's Reply to President de Gaulle 
(23 March)," ~ Letter, Vol. 14, No. 5 (May, 1966), p. 22. 
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Complaints concerning NATO's potentiality and possible lack of effective-
ness have frequently been voiced. France, by its actions over a period 
of years, has expressed its dissatisfaction with it and recently took 
steps to remove itself from the integrated features of the alliance. 
These events have confronted the United States with the reality 
that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is in severe difficulty. 
General Lauris Norstad, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, express-
ed the problem facing NATO and the United States in this manner: "But 
now,we have clearly moved from disarray to dissension to crisis. Let me 
h • h h" • • . 113 emp asize tat tis is a crisis. How did the alliance reach this 
"crisis" stage? What role did the United States play that such condi-
tions within NATO should exist? 
It is one of the assumptions of this study that the United States 
and the Soviet Union, because of their global interests, will continual-
ly be confronted with threats to their vital interests vis,·a-vis each 
other to the point of necessitating the maintenance of an adequate deter-
rent force by both countries. It is further assumed that the United 
States would possess a more favorable deterrent factor if it could main-
tain a formal military alignment with its current European allies than 
without them. 
On the basis of these assumptions it is the hypothesis of this study 
that United States policies have required a tight military integration 
of military forces within NATO, and that this integration has resulted 
in the breakdown of formal military coordination among its members. The 
3General Lauris Norstad, USAF, Ret., "The Crisis in NATO", Hearings 
Before the Committee~ Foreign Affairs, 89th Congress, 2nd Session (May 
25, 1966), p. 222. 
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United States during the formative years of NATO insisted upon the devel-
opment of a tightly integrated military organization and, because of its 
predominance of power, assumed almost all the major command positions. 
The United States enjoyed nearly absolute decision-making authority with-
in the entire alliance .. Western European states initially, because of 
their dependency upon the United States, accepted these conditions. Sub-
sequently, political leaders in Western Europe became suspicious of the 
structures of NATO because the concept of miJ,,itary integration violated 
. I 
their sensitivity over national. sovereigntnrecause they were fearful 
that an alliance so structured would not meet their security needs; and 
finally because such an organization interfered with policies that they 
desired to pursue toward the Soviet Union and other nations. United 
States refusal to adjust to these changing conditions led to the recent 
withdrawal of the FI'ench from NATO; this withdrawal has resulted in a 
serious breakdown of the NATO det~:~~~~This study will give consid-
erable attention to France's withdrawal from NATO in order to observe 
the impact of military integration on the alliance. 
The methodology employed in preparing this s~udy has been descrip-
tive and explanatory .. Documentary sources of the United States govern-
ment have contributed to vital data. Periodicals, pertinent journals, 
and news reports have added to the factual data required. Public state-
ments, as recorded in varied sources, of governmental leaders provided 
guidelines to the official policies pI'oposed and adopted by the differ-
ent member-states of NATO. 
A review of the literature pertaining to the problems confI'onting 
NATO did not disclose any pI'evious work that focused pI'imarily upon the 
political impact of military integration on NATO. Numerous sources deal, 
in somewhat superficial manner, with some of the disadvantages of mili-
tary integration or with a specific aspect of military integration and 
its consequences. The best work found in this area because of its ana-
lytical insight in relating NATO integration to subsequent political 
problem was by Robert Osgood.4 
Chapter II deals with the commitment of the United States to West-
ern Europe foll~wing World War II .. It also focuses upon the conditions 
existing in Europe during the immediate postwar years that were instru-
mental in the development of a tightly integrated military system in 
NATO. 
5 
Chapter III is concerned primarily with an analysis of the military 
organization that evolved within NATO. Data reveals that the United 
States was instrumental in the structuring of the alliance organization .. 
The high degree of military integration that was achieved became incon-
sistent .with traditional Western European concepts of sovereignty. The 
German case, while a special problem, illustrates this inconsistency 
vividly .. 
In Chapter IV the impact of the United States' directed military 
integration upon the actions of allied states is analyz~d. France is of 
particular importance in this chapter because her withdrawal from the 
integrated military structure of NATO has resulted in a disruption of 
military coordination of the North Atlantic community. German response 
to the military organization of NATO is also considered. 
Chapter V contains the conclusions drawn from the evidence presented. 
4Robert Endicott Osgood, ~ !h!:_ Entangling Alliance (Chicago, 
1962) .. 
CHAPTER II 
THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT TO WESTERN EUROPE 
To view the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the proper per-
spective of 1967 it is essential to view the world, and most especially 
the Western European scene, of 1949. In that immediate postwar period, 
where was Europe going, what were her plans, and with·what resources were 
those plans to be accomplished? What and how were the thoughts of her 
leaders to be transformed into realizable goals; to what degree could 
her aspirations be fulfilled or frustrated; who were her friends and who 
were her enemies? These were but a small fraction of the myriad of ques-
tions the world was asking of Europe and she was asking of herself in 
1949. 
The Europe of 1949 did not have to resort to the history books or 
to the vagueness of a grandfather's memory to recall the horrors of war. 
Bomb rubble instead of houses, an economy that could not provide the min-
imum subsistence for a major share of its citizenry, political instabil-
ity that threatened to topple governments, rampant disease and malnutri-
tion--this was Europe of the late forties. Yet, in this deg~neFate 
environment, there was generated an alliance that called for a massive 
effort of economic and military reconstruction. In a few years, though 
not without frustration for the United States, a remarkable recovery was 
achieved in Europe. 
6 
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American Interest in Europe 
One of the factors that contributed to the recovery of postwar West-
ern Europe was the continuation of American wartime interests in Europe. 
The United States had come to realize that her security was dependent 
upon a stable and prosperous Western Europe. William C. Foster expressed 
this interest in such a manner: "The national security of the United 
States is closely linked to the stability and progress of Western Europe. 
Indeed, neither can be strong without the other. 111 
There are at least three reasons why the United States is linked 
more closely to Europe than to any other area of the world. Economically 
Europe and the United States form a complimentary trading area. It is 
from Europe that the United States is able to trace its cultural roots--
language, religion, and the political philosophy of the United States had 
their origins in Europe. As evidenced by American participation on Europ-
ean battlefields twice this century, it is reasonable to deduce that 
American security is tied directly to the affairs of Europe. 
The combination of the United States-European industrial areas ere-
ates a mi..litary potential without equal in the world. It is this capac= 
ity, actual and potential, that excitas the interests of the United 
States. Since the war, all of the American aid and defense programs 
directed toward Western Europe have been oriented primarily to security 
interests. The United States has attempted by its leadership and assist-
ance to draw the nations of Western Europe within its military camp~ Had 
this failed, a secondary goal was to deny the Soviet Union the use of the 
1William c. Foster, Forward to~ and~ Future~ Europe by Ben 
T. Moore (New York, 1958), p. vii. 
8 
resources of these countries to augment its position of power. 
American participation in both World Wars in Europe gives evidence 
to the premise that its security does not stop at the ocean's edge. The 
United States has realized for many years that its security is interwoven 
with that of the Europeans. Should a hostile state dominate Europe, 
given its power potential and modern military technology, then the United 
States' security would be in question. The presence of hundreds of thou-
sands of American military personnel stationed on European soil continu-
ously since June 6, 1944 (D-Day) gives testimony to the fact that the 
United Statesi interests in Europe are far-reaching. American foreign 
policy has reflected a need in Western Europe for military cooperation. 
This need has been of a continuing nature to the present time. The pre-
sent-day antiair defense complex of the United States is predicated to 
a large extent upon European geography and cooperation;2 a segment of 
the American early warning system used to warn against ballistic missile 
attacks is located in Great Bri.tain. 
Economically, culturally, and militarily the United States has an 
interest in Europe and its affairs. Further advances in technology pos-
sibly will bring America and Europe closer together; modern transporta-
tion and communication may make it possible for Americans to accentuate· 
previous European contacts and interests. 
Postwar Soviet-American Conflict 
The United States, prior to World War II 1 was fearful of a powerful 
2Robert s. McNamara "McNamara's Defense Statement", Survival, Vol. 
B, No. 5 (May, 1966), p. 145. 
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and dominant Germany in Europe. Following the war, it became suspicious 
of the Soviet Union, whose military position, if unchallenged, might lead 
to Soviet domination of Eupope. It had been hoped by United States lead-
eriship that postwar conflicts might be settled within the United Nation's 
structu?'eo This apprioach to solving international problems requiried 
"Big Power" cooperation which President Roosevelt was confident could be 
realizedo Ronald Steele has expressed this hope and confidence in this 
wayg 
Through the United Nations Roosevelt hoped to turn Wilson's 
thwarted vision of world order into a pragmatic design that would 
guarantee the peace •••• With each of the powers (Russia, Britain, 
and China) attending to its own interiests, the United States whose 
global claims overlapped them all and whose influence over Britain 
and China was unquestioned, would be the deciding force in the 
world balance, enforcing peace through a world law directed by the 
United Nations. It was the blueprint for the American Century. 3 
Others in positions of authority were not so optimistic about Ameri-
can-Soviet cooperation after the war. Some American officials were of 
the opinion that the national interests of the Soviet Union were of such 
an order that there would be inevitable conflict. 4 
The first issue to give difficulty to the concept of "enforcing 
peace through world law" was the Soviet Union's refusal to honor the 
3Ronald Steele, The End of Alliance: American and the Future of 
Europe, (New York, 1964) ,pp .. 22-23. - - -
4With the retrospective wisdom of hindsight it i~ a simple matter 
to state unequivocally what the Soviet Union was or was not going to do, 
but some during World War II viewed a victorious Soviet Union with alarm. 
Quoting in a memorandum authored by W. c. Bullitt, first American ambas-
sador to the Soviet Union, "/Stalin is not7 a Duke of Norfolk but a Cau-
casian bandit whose only thought when he got something for nothing was 
that the other fellow was an ass, and that Stalin believed in the Commun-
ist creed which calls for conquest of the world for Communism." Quoted 
in Marshall Knappen, ~ Introduction to American Foreign Policy (New 
York, 1956), p. 245. 
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United Nations' request to remove Soviet troops from Iran in 1946. It 
had been agreed by the American, British, and Soviet leaders at Potsdam 
Conference 11 0 .... that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from 
Teheran, and that further stages of withdrawal of troops from Iran should 
be considered .. u" o 5 When the Soviets failed to withdraw their tI'Oops 
within the specified time, the Iranians pleaded their cause before the 
United Nations .. In attempting and failing to postpone discussion on. 
Iran, the Soviet delegation walked out of the Security Council meeting. 6 
This first walkout of many to follow indicated that the Soviet Union 
would thwart other issues within the United Nations in similar fashion 
if it served its national interests. 
Coupled with the veto, the walkout technique served notice that the 
United Nations was not going to be the exclusive arena in which the dif-
ferences of nations were to be sett~ed. If nations had intended to de-
pend upon the aegis of the United Nations for their security, they were 
vividly shown in March 1946 that, even on relatively minor points, the 
Soviet Union had no intention of allowing an international organization 
to dictate national policy to it. Should definitive measures be required, 
little or no assistance could be expected from the United Nations in op-
posing the independent actions of its members. These Soviet actions 
served to prove to many that the United Nations in theory and practice 
5Article XV, "Protocol of the Proceedings of the Potsdam Confer-
ence", August 1945 .. Source: "The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Con-
ference)", Foreifl Relations 2£. ~ United States, Diplomatic Papers, 
Government Printing Office (Washington, 1960), p. 1460~ 
6Although defying the immediate request of the United. Nations with-
drawn its troops from Iran,·the Soviet Union did comply with the request 
some two months after the originally agreed upon date. 
11 
was not going to be the panacea of the international ills of member na-
tions. 
When the United States in 1946 proposed " ••• the creation of an 
International Atomic Development Authority to which should be entrusted 
7 
all phases of the development and use of atomic energy", the world prob-
ably stood at the threshold of international control of nuclear technol-
ogy. However, the Soviet Union refused to accept such controls because 
of its desire for independent nuclear development which would be fruitful 
in the near futureQ 8 The Soviet Union had little, if anything, to gain 
by pooling its atomic resources and knowledge within an international 
agency controlled by the West. 
This refusal on the part of the Soviets, however, did much to sug-
gest that the Soviet Union was not willing at that time to submit to its 
wartime declaration to " ••• confer and cooperate ••• to bring a practicable 
general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the 
postwar period11 • 9 
A number of the Soviet actions following World War II were consid-
ered by American leaders to be in conflict with United States interests. 
The exercise of the veto, the "walkout" in the United Nations, and the 
refusal to accept international controls of nuclear technology generated 
7 Excerpt from a speech by Bernard Baruch before the first meeting 
of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, New York, ,June 14, 1946. 
Quoted in Alexander Baltzly and A. William Salome, eds. Readings in 
Twentieth-Century European History, (New York, 1950), p. 593. 
8Three months later the first Soviet atomic explosion was announced 
by President Truman on September 23, 1949. 
9Article VII, Four=Power Declaration~ General Security, signed in 
Moscow, November l, 1943 by the United States, United Kingdom, Soviet 
Union and China. 
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feelings of frustration and apprehensiveness on the part of Americans 
and Western Europeans. Another source of apprehension, especially for 
Western Europe, was the Soviet disregard of the Yalta Agreement as inter-
prated by the West regarding free elections for the people " ••• liberated 
from the domination of Nazi Germany and the former Axis
0
satellite states 
of Europe11 ,. 10 Though each case is unique in itself, the countries of 
Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, arid Romania have not had.the 
elections the Western powers thought they had agreed to at Yalta because 
of the Soviet Union's interference.11 Czechoslovakia was added to the 
list of countries in February 1948 when a Communist government was in-
stalled. The incorporation of the Eastern European countries into the 
Soviet sphere concerned the United States because this action was consid-
ered to pose a threat to the security of Western Europe. 
The Soviet Union further aggravated Western fears by establishing 
the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in 1947. During the height 
of American-Soviet wartime cooperation (May, 1943) a similar organiza-
tion, the Comintern, was dissolved. The explanation offered by the Execu-
tive Committee of the Third International for its dissolution was that 
" ••• in the countries of the anti-Hitlerite coalition the sacred duty of 
the widest masses of the people ••• consists in aiding by every means the 
military ~fforts of the governments of these countries aimed at the 
10In the Yalta Agreements (February 4-11, 1945) signed by Roosevelt, 
Churchill, and Stalin, it was agreed that the liberated peoples of Eur-
ope were to be allowed " .... to create democratic institutions of their 
own choice ..... " and to participate in " ••• free elections of governments 
responsible to the will of the people." 
11 Walter Consuelo Langsam, The World Since ~ (New York, 1954), 
pp .. 662-63. 
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speediest defeat of the Hitlerite bloc."12 At a meeting in Warsaw in 
1947, attended by European Communist leaders, the Communist Information 
Bureau was organized along lines similar to the Comintern. In their 
first official proclamation, the Communist officials reinstituted their 
earlier doctrines of 1919-1943 by stating that " ••• two opposite political 
lines have crystallized: on the one extreme the USSR and the democratic 
countries aim at whittling down imperialism ••• on the other side the 
United States of America and England aim at the strengthening of imper-
ialism11013 In ideological terms the Communists drew a sharp distinction 
between the Soviet world and the West. 
United States Involvement in Postwar Europe 
At warvs end the United States was financing a sorely-needed agency 
to assist Europe in postwar recovery and reconstruction. This agency, 
the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), was 
devised to help the victorious allies by providing them with emergency 
welfare assistance and assisting in the re-establishment of their econ-
omieso As an emergency stopgap measure, it enjoyed a large degree of 
success. By 1947 the financial grants from the United States to UNRRA 
totaled $2.7 billion.14 
The United States also felt compelled to respond to the pressures 
applied by the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean area. Under this Soviet 
pressure, it was feared that Turkey might yield to demands for a Soviet 
12Quoted in Langsam, .2£.• .=!!.•, p. 597. 
13Quoted in Baltzly and Salome, .2£.• ~., p. 598. 
14Kn · · ·t 386 appen, .2£.o .=!.-", p. • 
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foothold in the Dardanelles., Greece also was subject to pressure. The 
Greek communists instigated an insurrection against the newly establish-
ed Greek government and, using neighboring satellite states as bases for 
operations, the rebels enjoyed a moderate degree of military success. 
Greek appeals for an appointment of an impartial investigative body from 
the United Nations were met by a Soviet veto. Coupled with the inability 
of gaining any assistance from the United Nations, came an announcement 
from the British in February, 1947, that they could no longer continue 
to support or give aid to Greece or Turkey. 
Speaking before a joint session of Congress, President Truman re-
quested what was then considered an astronomical sum, 400 millions, 
" ... oto support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by 
. 15 
armed minorities or by outside pressures". These sums were to be used 
to assist Greece and Turkey. This speech marked a major change in Ameri-
can foreign policy as it recommended direct involvement in European af-
fairs. The United Nations was relegated to a secondary position by the 
American people when Congress overwhelmingly approved President Truman's 
prog:r>am, which came to be known as the "T:r>uman Doctrine". 
The need for Ame:r>ican involvement in the European economic sphere 
did not stop in 1947; Western Eu:r>ope was not. able to rebuild with limit-
ed financial gifts and :r>elatively small loans. The Ame:r>icans had to be-
come more deeply involved in the internal problems of the European na .. 
tions if any measure of success was to be forthcoming. Within 
l 511Recommendations on Greece and Turkey", Department of State 
Bulletin, Vol., 16 (March 23, 1947), p. 534. 
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kn d ab • 1 16 E • 11 'd di owle ge le circ es, a uropean economic co apse was consi ere n-
evitable if much more American aid were not pi:;,ovided. Such a·. collapse 
would suggest the validity of communist propaganda that capitalism was 
dying; but of more serious consequences to the United States, an economic 
chaotic situation would be extremely fertile ground for European commun-
ist political parties to exploit or an invitation for the Soviet Union 
to expand its influence in Western Europe. 
A major involvement was called for and proposals for such were made 
within Congress. To thwart Soviet influence and to assist Europe in a 
meaningful recovery program, President Truman requested $17 billion dol-
lars from Congress to aid Europe over a four-year period. 17 Since these 
sums.would require tax money from the majority of the Americans, the use 
of these do·11ars would have to be justified to the American public. The 
mood for explaining this massive American involvement had been set by 
Secretary of State Marshall in an address at Cambridge in June, 1947 when 
he stated: "Political parties or groups- which seek to perpetuate human 
misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will en-
counter the opposition of the United States".18 A few months later the 
President, in an address to Congress, pointed out the American interest 
and justification for European involvement when he said: "The next few 
16During this period, the Administration (Democratic) and the lead-
ers of Congress (notably Republican Senator Arthur·H. Vandenberg) became 
involved in an active instructional campaign to inform the American 
people of the seriousness of the Soviet threat. · 
17cecil V~ Crabb, Jr., American Foreign Policy in the Nuclear Age 
(Evanstan, Illinois and Elmsford, New York, 1960), p:-228":"' 
1811European Initiative Essential to Economic Recovery", Department 
of State Bulletin, Vol. 16 (June 15, 1947), p. 1160. 
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years can determine whether the free countries of Europe will be able to 
preserve their heritage of freedom~ •• L_Event~ might well compel us to 
modify our own economic system and to forego, ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
security, (emphasis mine), the enjoyment of many of our freedoms and 
• ·1 11 19 privi eges. 
Senator Vandenberg and other internationally-minded Congressmen sup-
ported this program which was known as the Marshall Plan. This plan, 
which initially provided for an all=European economic recovery program, 
became limited in scope with the refusal of Albania, Bulgaria, Finland, 
Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union to participate. After 
the Czechoslovakian coup, both Czechoslovakia and Poland refused to be 
recipients of Marshall Plan assistance. Thus an economic plan became, 
in effect» a device for strengthening the political barriers that exist-
ed between the Soviet Union and the United States. In time the Marshall 
Plan became the frame of reference for future American aid programs that 
developed into "military assistance" and "defense support" programs. 
Within a month of the Czechoslovakian coup and with the active en-
couragement of the United Stat~s the Western Europeans reacted in a 
positive manner to past Soviet actions and possible future intentions.'20 
In recognition of these S.oviet actions and their own individual military 
weaknesses, five European nations-:--Belgium, France, Great Britain, Luxen= 
burg, and the Netherlands--joined into an alliance that was intended to 
1911A Program for United States Aid to European Recovery", Depart-
ment of State Bulletin, Vol. 17 (December 18, 1947), p. 1234. 
----------
20 Crabb, ~Q cit., p. 239. 
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last for fifty years. Commonly referred to as the Brussels Treaty,21 
it made provision for the establishment of a joint military organization, 
Uniforce, which was initially commanded by Field Marshal Viscount Mont-
gomery. As shown by President Truman's comments regarding the Brussels 
Treaty, it was evident that the United States was in accord with Europe's 
desire to protect its security by military means: 
This development /Brussels Treat~ deserves our full sup-
port. I am confident that the United States will, by approp-
riate means, extend to the free nations the support which the 
situation requires. I am sure that the determination of the 
free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be match-
ed by an equal determination on our part to help them do so . 22 
Too meager in resources and plagued with internal problems, this treaty 
was not enough to effectively oppose a Soviet menace, but it did express 
a clear understanding on the part of the states of Western Europe that 
their survival depended upon military cooperation with each other and 
with the United States. This alliance was the forerunner of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
To effect the coalescence of Europeans, traditionally distrustful 
of one another, to mold the war-weary Americans to accept an entangling 
alliance with Eruope, to force a radical change in American foreign poli-
cy, and to commit American military units to Europe in peace probably 
would have been an almost impossible task except for one occurrence--the 
Berlin blockade. The Berlin blockade, with its possible consequences of 
starving two million Germans, focused the world's attention upon the ex-
tremes that the Soviets were willing to use in order to achieve its aim . 
21Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collec-
tive Self-Defense signed in Brussels in March, 1948. 
22Quoted in M,. Margaret Ball, ~ ~ !!!.:_ European Union Movement 
(New York, 1959), p. 11. 
18 
"Mass democracies must be conditioned to support necessary but un-
popular measures by a step-at-a-time process. 1123 Many steps had already 
been taken by the Americans in assisting the Europeans--relief, loans, 
the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan. Now it was obvious to a 
great many Americans that more was required. 
Goaded by the Soviet blockade of Berlin, prompted by the 
economic weakness of what remained of Europe and her inabil-
ity to defend herself, the United States in 1948 began to 
throw her entire weight behind an effort to put Atlantic or-
ganization on a firm footing.24 
Soon the United States would "throw her entire weight" into military com-
mitments that have lasted to the present time. 
Less than three months after the .Soviets imposed their blockade on 
Berlin, a proposal was adopted by the Senate to provide for the " ••• de-
velopment of regional and other collective arrangements for individual 
and collective self-defense ••• 11 • 25 One year later, the Senate ratified 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
As written by the Persian poet, Omar Khayyam: 
The Moving Finger writes; and having writ, 
Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor wit 
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line 1 
Nor all thy tears wash out a Word of it.£6 
For the Americans, there was no turning back--the responsibility of lead-
ership was theirs. The Americans were on their way to becoming one of 
23Knappen, ;2.• cit., p. 346. 
24Frank Munk, Atlantic Dilemma: Partnership~ Community (Dobbs 
Ferry, New York, 1964), pp. 8-9. 
25Part of the Vandenberg Resolution which was presented to the 
Senate by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg in June 1948. The Resolution 
passed by a vote of 64-6. 
26omar Khayyam, Rubaiyat of~ Khayyam, Edward Fitzgerald, tr. 
(New York, 1946), p . 32. 
19 
the two primary decision-makers of the worldo Now, by design or default, 
the United States was to pursue actively a policy of "containment11 o 27 
27The term "containment" is primarily military in connotation and 
is used to describe operations for holding the enemy within a given 
areao It achieved its diplomatic respectability when an American career 
diplomat supplied the label for the Truman Doctrine by writing, "In 
these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United 
States policy,- towards the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient 
but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies11 o See 
George Fo Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago, 1951), Po 119. 
CHAPTER III 
MILITARY INTEGRATION WITHIN NATO 
In planning any military activity, whether it is offensive or de-
fensive, the systematic use of men, equipment, and strategy is of prim-
ary importanceo Military commanders function on the premise that the 
greater the coordination of these vital elements in the combat situa-
tion, the greater the likelihood of military success. In developing a 
deterrent to a possible aggressor, those involved with the planning must 
be concerned with the prospects of success in battle should the ,deter-
rence failo If battlefield success is unlikely, the deterrent value of 
military forces-in-being or potentially available is negligible. 
The United States, in planning the development of a deterrent to 
possible Soviet aggression in Western Europe, was concerned with the 
creation of a tightly integrated and well-equipped military force in 
NATO comprised of men from the various allied countries, using standard-
ized equipment, and functioning on the basis of a common strategy. Be-
cause of the preponderance of United States power on the immediate post-
war European scene, the United States was able to control all three of 
the vital elements of the new multinational military force: to an over-
whelming degree the United States commanded the men of NATO; it controll-
ed the weapons of NATO; and it determined the vital strategy. Control 
of all three factors came through the process of military integration. 
20 
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The Organization of NATO 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into being primarily to 
meet the security needs of like-minded nations.! The impetus for the 
creation of such a traditional alliance was, in the words of Henry Kis-
singer: 
(1) To provide an accretion of power •••• The wider the 
alliance, the greater its power to resist aggression. (2) 
To leave no doubt about the alignment of forces. (3) To trans-
form a tacit interest in mutual assistance into a formal 
obligation. 2 
The Treaty of 1949 did provide for an "accretion of power" on a wide 
base. Extending from the western shore of the Northern Hemisphere to 
tbe heart of continental Europe, the base included two of the three 
major industrial areas of the world. The Treaty document formalized an 
already existing "alignment of forces" between North America and Western 
Europe. The Treaty encompassed all of Kissinger's basic reasons for the 
creation of a traditional alliance. Treaty members formally stated a 
common interest in resisting the Soviet Union should a member's terri-
torial integrity be impinged directly. As stated by Mrogenthau: 
Common interests are the . rocks on which all alliances 
are built. Yet upon this rock all kinds of structures may 
be erected ••• there are good and bad alliances, some that work 
smoothly and are enthusiastically supported, others that are 
cumbersome and are grudgingly accepted as a lesser evil. 
While the existence of an alliance depends upon a community 
of interests, its quality is determined by the manner in 
which common interests are translated into concrete policies 
1The original signatories were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Iceland, Italy, Luxenberg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United 
Kingdom, and the United States. Greece and Turkey acceded to the 
treaty in 1952, and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955. 
2
~enry A. Kissinger, I!!!:. Troubled Partnership~ Re-appraisal of~ 
Atlantic Alliance (New York, London, Toronto, 1965), p. 11. 
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and day-to-day measures. 3 
Since the signing of the Treaty nearly eighteen years ago a complex 
organization has evolved. The original "rock of the structure" was to 
be a defensive alliance "designed primarily to deter a military attack 
upon Western Europe and to provide mutual support to members in case an 
attack should occur either in Europe or North America". 4 By definition, 
it could be surmised that the North Atlantic Treaty was similar in form 
and substance to many other alliances that preceded it in history. How-
ever, there were those who viewed this Treaty with much deeper signi-
ficance; they had an almost mesmeric devotion to the principles of fed-
eration or supranationalism. Some viewed it as more than a " ••• defens-
ive alliance, born of the need of the moment ••• it is also the core of a 
more profound historical reality: the share destiny of the West which, 
in essence and mission, forms a single civilization". 5 Others with a 
more pragmatic bent towards supranationalistic organizations believed 
that, " ••• NATO possesses a potential for integration that could become 
the basis for a future community" and because of a " ••• common humanistic 
heritage116 its member-states could develop common economic, political, 
and military policies to the point of submerging their national sover-
eignty. Today, some visualize that " ••• ·the members of NATO are moving 
3Hans J. Morgenthau, "Alliances in Theory and Practice", Alliance 
Policy in~~, Arnold Wolfers, ed . (Baltimore, 1959), pp. 197-198. 
4Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, The Politics of the 
Atlantic Alliance (New York, London, 1964), p. 1977 ~~ 
5Prince Hubertus Zu Lowenstein and Volkmar von Zuhlsdorff, NATO 
and the Defense~!!!=..~, Edward Fitzgerald, tr. (New York, 1962), 
~3-=--
6Kurt Birrenbach, The Future~~ Atlantic Community (New York, 
London, 1963), p. 3. 
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toward a closer union, a confederation, a commonwealth ••• 117 which could 
ultimately result in a United States of Europe. One source believed that 
this feeling of oneness has permeated NATO fighting forces by stating: 
••• these fighting forces from many countries now possess 
a common political will /that/ distinguishes NATO from most 
alliances of the past. NATO-is more than a military alliance 
of expediency; it is united by a common outlook which reaches 
from the top echelons to the youngest recruit. 8 
A cursory review of the treaty articles might lead one to conclude 
that the signatories intended that the treaty go beyond the scope of 
other "traditional" military alliances. The preamble of the treaty men-
tions "liberty, rule of law, and well-being" before "collective defense, 
peace, and security". (See Appendix). One of the treaty provisions, 
Article 2, seems to have more than military implications with its con-
cept of encouraging " ••• economic collaboration between any or all of 
them". Was it the intention of the original membership to develop some-
thing more than a military alliance? No so, according to Robertson, who 
gives little weight to these "airy generalities", because " ••• it has be-
come fashionable to wrap up the military provisions of a treaty in ex-
pressions of good intentions of this sort". 9 
In recognition of the democratic parliaments of the member-states, 
the military clause10 contained a provision that, if " ••• an armed attack 
7Lowenstein and von Zuhlsdorff, ~· cit., p. 4. 
8Ibid., p. 76. 
9 A.H. Robertson, European Institutions, Co-operation: Integration: 
Unification (New York, 1959), p. 90. The author develops the point fur-
ther by emphasizing NATO's unbalanced (political) membership prevents it 
from being considered a "community". 
10Article 5, see Appendix. 
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occurs, each of them ••• will assist ••• by taking ••• such action as it deems 
necessary, including the use of force". Although military response from 
allies to a member under attack is not automatic, the Organization has 
so evolved that this aspect has become one of NATO's major problems. 
The other articles pertain to the scope of treaty limitations; i.e., 
geographical delination, recognition of United Nations responsibilities, 
future membership, ratification procedure, and time specifications. 
The implementation of the treaty was provided for in Article 9 which 
authorized the establishment of a Council: (1) to consider matters con-
cerning implementation; (2) to be so organized as to be able to meet 
promptly; (3) to set up subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; (4) to 
establish a defense committee. On the surface it is possible to visual-
ize that " ••• NATO is a intergovernmental organization in the traditional 
style1111 without much variance from most of the alliances of the past. 
Viewed only from the wording of the treaty articles this appears to be 
so except for the implementation procedures and results therefrom. 
It will be observed that the North Atlantic Treaty is ex-
tremely laconic about the international machinery which was to 
be set up to give effect to its provisions •••• Nothing is said 
about the many other committees, both military and civil, which 
were later found necessary, nor about an international staff or 
combined military forces under a joint command. All this was 
left for the future •••• 12 
It is at this point in the development of NATO that this study will focus 
as the genesis of the major problems confronting NATO today. 
In September 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty members began to form 
the Organization. The main organs were created during the first four 
11 Cottrell and Dougherty,~· cit., p. 25. 
12Robertson, ~· cit., p. 83. 
25 
meetings of a Council which, after nine months of negotiations, decided 
its own composition to be the Foreign Ministers of the member states who 
were to meet once annually except during a crisis or actual aggression. 13 
Within the Council, NATO is an inter-governmental organization. Council 
decisions concerning NATO are technically based on the rule of unanimity 
recognizing the concept of legal equality among states. However, real 
decision- making authority rests primarily with the four major states as 
is suggested by Cottrell and Dougherty: 
Undoubtedly the four major allies (United States, Brit-
ain, France and West Germany) carry a great deal more politi-
cal weight than, say, Iceland or Luxenberg. But, unlike the 
Charter of the United Nations ••• the NATO Treaty does not 
spell out any special powers (such as a veto) for the major 
members which are withheld from the lesser allies.14 
For purposes of continuity the Council established Permanent Repre-
sentatives who represent the Ministers in their absence. Remaining in 
close consultation with their respective Ministers, the Permanent Repre-
sentatives possess virtually the same powers of decision as do their 
superiors. The Permanent Representatives of ambassadorial rank meet on 
a weekly basis to resolve matters of routine . Twice annually the Foreign 
Ministers (Secretary of State in the United States) meet to discuss the 
. . . ' more pressing matters and to issue the more important co~muniques. Once, 
in December 1957, the Council met at the level of the Heads of Government . 
It is claimed that the purpose of this latter meeting was to promote "al-
liance solidarity" as a reaction to the Soviet space success during the 
previous October that " ••• had temporarily cast a shadow of doubt over the 
13 Cottrell and Dougherty,~· cit., p. 28. 
14Ibid., p. 29. 
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technological superiority of the United States11 • 15 
Since the proceedings of the Council meetings ~re never publicly 
disseminated, it is possible only to speculate on the nature of the dis-
' cussions by the various nations from the official communiques issued at 
the completion of the official sessions. The rationale for closed ses-
sions of the Council is the belief that " ••• the intricate details of al-
liance negotiations and strategic planning cannot be argued under the 
full glare of publicity" and it is easier to achieve frank and free dis-
cussion in private sessions . 16 
Since all NATO organs--political, economic, or military--are sub-
ordinate to the Council, it is in the Council that major policy is 
"hammered out" for the entire structure. From the beginning, the Coun-
cil has assumed a wide range of responsibilities . It: 
(1) creates and maintains the military structure required 
for the integrated defense ••• ; (2) formulates the basic strategy 
for the local defense of Europe against aggression; (3) estab-
lishes military force levels; (4) ensures the co-ordination of 
member's efforts ••• ; (5) receives, debates and accepts the re-
port on the Annual Reviewl7 • •• ; (6) approves military organi-
zational changes in Europe ••• ; (7) approves major NATO appoint-
ments ••• ; (8) decides on the admission of new members to NATO; 
(9) establishes and reviews the work of the political, cultural 
and economic committees ••• ; (10) co- ordinates allied policy on 
major political questions ••• 18 
Since the Lisbon Conference of 1952, the Council has been in 
15rbid. 
16Ibid., p. 30. 
17The Annual Review can be compared with the planning, discussion, 
and acceptance of the United States defense budget. See Lowenstein and 
von Zuhlsdorff, ~· cit . , Chapte~ 13 for a detailed description of NATO's 
Annual Review procedures. 
18cottrell and Dougherty,~· cit . , pp. 32-33. 
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permanent session, usually meeting twice weekly, to discuss the current 
issues confronting NATO. Very little within the borders of member-
states appears not to be within the Council's range of discussion. A 
great deal of discussion concerning the foreign policies of members seems 
to take place . 19 However, approval by unanimity protects each member 
from Council action that might be prejudicial to its national interest. 
Article 9 gave the Council authority to implement the treaty and to 
establish the necessary subsidary bodies. The Council has created num-
erous bodies under this authority. There are thirteen standing commit-
ties and a considerable number of working groups under the direct aus-
pici es of the Council. Although the articles of the treaty specified 
only economic and military provisions, the Council has created such di-
verse committees as Science, Information and Cultural Relations, Food 
and Agricultural Planning, Medical, Coal and Steel Planning, Civil Avia-
tion, and Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport. Further 
down the scale of command, within the NATO Secretariate, is the Commit-
tee for Pure and Applied Science, and the Committee for the Press. No 
doubt preparations for modern war can encompass a nation's total capabil-
ityi but one can not help but wonder whether the planners of NATO envis-
aged such multiplicity of efforts and interests within the original al-
liance. 
The Council should possess the bureaucratic capacity to analyze the 
"imponderable and subjective factors" referred to by Osgood: 
••• military strategy transcends to the traditional realm 
of the military specialist and exceeds the bounds of purely 
military logic ••• the nature of the threat and the resulting 
contingencies in which the use of force should be anticipated 
--are as much matters of political as military judgement. And 
even the planning of military responses and capabilities, al-
though a highly technical operation, requires ••• a novel type 
of systematic analysis of imponderable and subjective factors. 20 
Apparently, the numerous committees are considered necessary to assist 
the military planners in analyzing the many "factors" that comprise the 
determination of military strategy. 
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In compliance with Article 9 a high level Defense Committee was es-
tablished. This committee was composed of the Defense Ministers of the 
member-states. It was its responsibility to recommend measures for the 
implementation of the articles pertaining to an armed attack. In less 
than two years time after its creation, because of a duplication of ef-
fort and responsibility with other .NATO agencies, the Defense Committee 
merged with the Councii. 21 
When the Defense Committee was formed, a Military Committee, consist-
ing of the member-states' Chiefs of Staff, 22 was created for the purpose 
of advising it on military matters. Since the Defense Committee was 
merged with the Council, the Military Committee has advised the Council 
directly on military questions. However, the Military Committee has not 
functioned effectively because of the national demands made upon each 
representative of the Military Committee, and because of the frustrating 
rule of unanimity within its decision-making process. Because of these 
conditions the Military Committee's functions are performed by a smaller 
20Robert Endicott Osgood,~~ Entangling Alliance (Chicago 
and London, 1962), p. 7. 
21Lowenstein and von Zuhlsdorff, ~· cit., p. 65. 
22Iceland, which has no military forces, is always represented by 
a civilian on the Military Committee. 
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body called the Standing Group. 
The Standing Group is a direct manifestation of the power structure 
within NATO since it consists of the Military Committee's representative 
from the United States, Great Britain, and France. As the three most 
powerful members of NATO, this group enjoys a privileged position as the 
executive arm of the Military Committee. It is the Standing Groupi in 
conjunction with the Military Committee, that exercises direct control 
over the major NATO commands; Supreme Allied Commander (SACLANT), Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), Channel Committee, and the Canadian-
American Regional Planning Group. In the event of war it is the Standing 
Group that would function as the Supreme Command. 23 
As in each of the member countries, the political authority has 
primacy over the military forces in NATO. The Council, composed of civil-
ians, transmits its instructions and policy statements to the Military 
Committee, which in turn has its orders implemented by the Standing Group. 
The Standing Group is located in the Pentagon, which also houses the 
Joint Chiefs-of-Staff and the major military hierarchy of United States 
military forces. 
In addition to directing the NATO military command organization, 
the Standing Group also co-ordinates defense planning within the geogra-
phical perimeter protected by NATO forces. The Standing Group is dir-
ectly represented on the Council by a general officer who is assisted by 
a large staff. The existence of this direct representative results in 
the by-passing of the Military Committee. This officer furnishes to the 
Council technical military advice, and he has the authority to make 
23Ibid. , pp. 322-23. 
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direct recommendation to the Council. 24 Such a chain-of-command arrange-
ment has conferred upon the Standing Group an inordinate amount of author-
ity not commensurate with its numerical representation. It is probable 
that the Standing Group, representing the more powerful members and hav-
ing direct access to the supreme authority of NATO--the Council, is more 
able to affect the policies of their respective countries than the poli-
cies of those members who do not have representation on the Standing 
Group. 
The Standing Group has specifically assigned duties that can, and 
often do, have far-reaching consequences. Supervising the Military 
Agency for Standardization allows considerable latitude to the three na-
tions in the realm of recommendations for weapons, tools, and other im-
plements of war to be used by NATO forces. The Standing Group also has 
supervisory control over the Advisory Group on Aeronautical Research and 
Development, the Communications Agencies in Europe, and the NATO Defense 
College. 25 
NATO was given no forces of its own in 1949, and there was no treaty 
obligation to provide forces in specific numbers or categories even in 
the event of emergency. No doubt the member-states had placed a great 
deal of reliance on the United States monopoly of nuclear weapons in the 
defense of Europe, but all had an awareness that military forces would 
have to be forthcoming if Article 5 was to have any significance to the 
Soviet Union. But before effective military forces could be built, a 
24cottrell and Dougherty,~· cit., pp. 34-5 . 
25M. Margaret Ball,~ and the European Union Movement (New York, 
1959), pp. 60- 62. 
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determination had to be made concerning their numbers and functions. 
The United States, by its actions and declarati~ns, had convinced 
the Europeans that the American government and people would become mili-
tarily involved in Europe should aggression occur. What type of mili-
tary involvement? To what extent would United States' forces be commit-
ted? After experiencing the vast amount of destruction and death during 
the previous liberation of Europe, it was of paramount concern to the 
Europeans that the strategy, and the forces allocated to support that 
strategy 9 be of such design that an invader could not possibly occupy 
their countries. A deter-and-liberate policy would not do; the policy 
must be deter-and-defend. 
Integration of the Military Forces 
Defense, not liberation, of Europe was agreed upon by the United 
States, primarily because of the psychological implications and secondar-
ily because of military considerations: 
It must be perfectly clear to the people of the United 
States that we cannot count on our friends in Western Europe 
to resist if our strategy in the event of war is to abandon 
these friends to the enemy with a promise of later libera-
tion. That strategy would be costly, since it could produce 
nothing better than impotent and disillusioned allies in the 
event of war •••• Western Europe must count on us if it is to 
survive, and we1 in turn, must count on Western Europe if we 
are to endure .2b 
Reflecting the newly-adopted strategy wants of its members, the NATO De-
fense Committee in 1949 produced its first integrated defense plan which 
called for the production and delivery of weapons and equipment. This 
26Harry Truman, "The U. S. Military Assistance Program", Department 
of State Bulletin, Vol. 20 (May 22, 1949), p. 645. 
first war plan was " ••• predicated on the defense of all NATO members 
rather than withdrawal ••• 1127 and to this day, the strategy of defending 
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Europe by NATO forces has remained unchanged. This plan was known as the 
"forward strategy", and it eventually justified the granting of NATO mem-
bership to the Federal Republic of Germany, and resulted in the introduc-
tion of tactical nuclear weapons in the arsenals of NATO. The Soviet 
Union also gave recognition to the existence of a common NATO strategy 
confronting it as expressed by a Marshal of the Soviet Union: 
In contrast to prewar years, when the strategy of the prin-
cipal capitalist countries bore a distinctly national character, 
the postwar period has been characterized by a tendency toward 
uniformity in national military strategies and their combination 
into a single global military strategy, intended to assure the 
realization of American foreign policy aims ••• thermonuclear 
weapons ••• facilitated the consolidation of the imperialist 
forces under the leadership of the United States, and exerted 
considerable influence on the development of a unified imperial-
ist military policy and strategy determined by American ruling 
circles.28 
Should Europe be compelled to fight under a single plan, it would also 
fight under a balanced force concept as proposed by the NATO Council. 
Europe, at NATO's birth, collectively might have mustered sufficient mil-
itary forces to repel an invader, but no single nation in Europe could 
afford national forces that would be of adequate strength by itself to 
deter or defend against Soviet aggression. Consequently the Council 
urged the member governments to concentrate on the construction of bal-
anced collective forces instead of each attempting to build balanced 
27Ball, ~· cit., p. 40. 
28v. D. Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, Herbert s. Dinerstein 
and others 9 tr. (Englewood Cliffs, 1963), pp. 151-52. 
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national forces. 29 This was the beginning of the integrated force system 
that eventually in various degrees plagued the cohesiveness of the al-
liance. 
In addition to integrating strategies and forces, NATO also consid-
ered the feasibility of integrating the command structure. The Korean 
War pointed out the danger of war in Europe because of the insufficiency 
of military forces in Western Europe. Recognizing the danger, the Coun-
cil determined that an integrated military force commanded by a single 
military commander would bolster the defenses of NATo. 30 In December 
1950 General Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander by the Council . 
Eisenhower was a logical selection as he had been the " ••• personal embodi-
ment of the allied war effort, and his appointment translated an as yet 
abstract alliance into tangible reality11 • 31 By degrees, the strategy, 
forces, and command structure of NATO were integrated; as time passed, 
the degree of integration became closer knit as the United States contri-
bution to NATO increased. 
The appointment of an American as Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR), was precedent-setting for NATO. Since the initial appointment, 
this top command post of NATO has always been held by an American: Gener-
al Dwight D. Eisenhower (December 1950 - June 1952); General Matthew B. 
Ridgway (June 1952 - July, 1953); General Alfred M. Gruenther (July, 
1953 - November, 1956); General Lauris Norstad (November 1956 - January 
29Ball, ~· cit., p. 41. 
30Robertson, ~· cit., p. 85. 
31Lowenstein and von Zuhlsdorff , ~· cit., p. 75. 
32 1963); General Lyman Lemnitzer (January, 1963--present). 
Arriving in Paris a month after his appointment as SACEUR, Eisen-
34 
hewer began immediate preparations to build a military force. He appoint-
ed an American, General Gruenther, as his Chief of Staff and chose Marly, 
near Paris, as his headquarters-~Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe (SHAPE). It was from here that NATO was to be translated from 
paper proposals into a "tangible reality" that was to " ••• provide poli-
tical and psychological reinforcement in the continuing political war-
fare of the cold war11 • 33 He and his staff started immediately " ••• to 
turn the armies of the allies into an allied army11 • 34 
Some of his immediate problems are described as follows: 
The forces at the disposal of SACEUR must be welded into an 
effective and integrated organization. This demands in turn an 
integrated logistics systems and an adequate level of stocks. 
Despite having assigned their troops to the allied commanders, 
there are few signs that the member countries are prepared to 
give the commanders a like authority over the means with which 
their troops must fight.35 
Of prime concern to General Eisenhower was not only how large a force 
was to be under his command, but from where and when would the where-
withal to condact military operations be forthcoming. Assigned United 
States forces on the day of his command appointment, he was faced with 
the pressing problem of providing the "means" with which his troops 
could fight, if the need should arise. 
32cottrell and Dougherty,~· cit . , p . 37. 
33osgood, ~· cit., p. 30. 
34Lowenstein and von Zuhlsdorff, ~· cit., p. 75. 
35T. w. Mulley, The Politics of Western Defense (New York, 1962), 
p. 224. 
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In NATO terminology, military facilities are called "infrastruc-
ture.n36 The first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay, described in-
frastructure as " ••• installations which are set up at the request of NATO 
international Commanders for the maintenance and training of NATO inter= 
national forces 11 • 37 General Eisenhower received the authorization for 
the required facilities the following September when the Council deter-
mined that there was a 11 .~.need for sharing the burden of financing in-
stallad.ons", and ever since 1951, members " ••• have financed infrastruc-
ture items jointly11 • 38 From the very beginning of NATO, starting with 
the approval of the first master defense plan by President Truman in 
January 1950, the United States has been the largest contributor of 
money and materia1. 39 The formula for sharing infrastructure costs has 
always been determined in a somewhat arbitrary manner as explained by 
the first Secretary-General& 
They dumped the whole problem in my lap, so I called in 
three assistant secretaries-general, and each of us drew up 
our own list of what we thought the percentage of sharing 
should be, and then we averaged them out. I couldn't for the 
life of me possibly say on what basis I acted, except I tried 
to take into account all sorts of things like the ability to 
pay and whether the building would be going on in a country 
so that it would benefit from the construction and the. money 
3611 Infrastructureii is a word borrowed from French railroad termin-
ology~ where it is applied to all of the installations (as tunnels and 
Embankments) required before a railroad can be completed. Within NATO 
the term has been broadened to includeg bases, supplies of fuel, lines 
of communication, depots, and headquarters. See Roger Hilsman, "NATO: 
The Developing Strategic Context", NATO and American Security, Klaus 
Knorr, edo (Princeton, 1959)" p. 21:-- -
37 Quoted in Ball,££.• cit., p. 85. 
38Ibid. 
39 Ibid., p. 40. 
36 
spento 40 
The "ability to pay" concept saddled the United States with the lion's 
share of the expenses,. 41 Until 1961 the United States paid almost three 
times the amount as the number two contributor 1 Germany 1 which was 36.98 
and 13072 percent respectively. Since 1961, the United States, still the 
major contributor, has paid about 30 percent and Germany, still number 
two, bas paid approximately 20 percent. It is noted that the combined 
costs to United States, Germany, and Britain is over 60 percent, or al-
most two-thirds of the total contribution. 42 
Possessing the largest submarine fleet in the worl4, and modern, 
well-equipped naval forces, the Soviet Navy posed almost as formidable 
a threat to NATO as did Soviet armies,. After providing for and integrat-
ing their land forces, the NATO planners directed their efforts toward 
possible warfare on the sea. Less than one year after the creation of 
the land command (SHAPE) a NATO sea command was formed. The first Su-
preme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) established his headquarters 
in Norfolk, Virginia. The first commander was an American admiral and 
this command position has remained in American hands since. 
SACLANT consists of fleet units from the maritime powers of NATO, 
giving the American commander authority over the naval forces of Brit-
ain, Canada, France, Portugal·~ Norway, Denmark, and Holland as well as 
the United States naval base at Keflavik, Iceland .. He also wears 
another "hat11 a$ the commander of the United States Atlantic Fleet,. As 
40Quoted in Alastair Buchan, ~ .!!!:, ~ 1960s (New York, 1960)i 
PPo 113-14" 
41Robertson, ~" .s!:!:_., p,. 86. 
42Mulley, ~/ =.!!•, p. 190. 
with SACEUR, there is also a considerable degree of integration of 
strategy, command and infrastructure. 
During the ten or twelve naval exercises which were held 
every year ••• SACLANT exercises direct and supreme command 
over this NATO force, just as he would in the event of war •••• 
SACLANTus task is to draw up strategic plans, to urge the 
national authorities (through the Standing Group, NATO's 
'general StaffU) to maintain a high level of preparedness, 
and to set up a cadre organization which could exercise dir-
ect supreme command over the united NATO fleets in the event 
of war. 43 
Unlike SACEUR, the commander of SACLANT does not have military units 
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permanently assigned to his command except during training maneuvers and 
time of war. The degree of integration is less rigid for the NATO naval 
forces than the land forces, but similar forms of integration do exist 
at the highest echelons of command. Perhaps the rationale for more inte-
gration of the land forces than the sea forces is best expressed by 
Moore: 
The only way to have an effective ground force made up 
of several national contributions is to place it under a 
single command and give that command the powers necessary 
to enable it to fight effectively as a unit. The need for 
integration has not been so clear in the naval commands 
and the various allies have retained a greater degree of 
independent control over their naval forces. Confidence of 
its members in the fairness and military competence of SHAPE 
has also been an essential factor.44 
The responsibility of SACLANT encompasses the Atlantic Ocean from 
the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer but excludes the waters adjacent 
to the British Isles. This responsibility entails the protection of the 
43Lowenstein and von Zuhlsdorff, ~· cit., p. 24. 
44Ben T. Moore, ~and~ Future ~ Europe (New York, 1958), 
p. 87. 
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"ooolifelines of the free world in the Atlantic11 • 45 The surrounding 
waters of Britain that are not included in SACLANT's area of responsi-
bility are defended by a separate NATO unit directly under the command 
of the Military Committee--the Channel Committee. The Channel Committee 
is a maritime command which consists of the Naval Chiefs-of-Staff of 
Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. From its initial forma-
tion, its operational commander has always been a British admiral. The 
operational command, Allied Command Channel, has its headquarters in 
Portsmouth, England and is staffed largely by British personnel. 46 
The remaining military command of NATO is the Canada-United States 
Regional Planning Group which has equal status to SACEUR, SACLANT, and 
the Channel Committee in the military command structure. Initially NATO 
established five Regional Planning Groups,47 but with the subsequent de-
velopment of SACEUR and its subordinate commands, 48 duplication and over-
lapping of lines of command and responsibility resulted. Thus all but 
one of the Planning Groups, the Canada-United States Planning Group, was 
abolishedo This group has developed the tightest form of integration 
within NATO; it is here that the strategic plans for the joint land and 
air defense of the North American continent are formulated. 49 
45Ball., ~o cit., Po 64 . 
46 Cottrell and Dougherty,~· cit. , p. 35. 
47These were the Northern European Regional Planning Group, the 
Western European Regional Planning Group, the Southern European-Western 
Mediterranean Regional Planning Group, the North Atlantic Ocean Regional 
Planning Group, and the Canadian-United States Regional Planning Group. 
48Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH), Allied Forces Central 
Europe (AFCENT), Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH), and Allied 
Forces Mediterranean. 
49Lowenstein and von Zuhlsdorff, ~· cit., p. 77. 
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Meeting in Lisbon in February 1952, the Council reviewed the ac-
complishments up to that date. In less than three years NATO had been 
able to adopt a common strategy; integrated commands for land, sea, and 
air defense had been established; common infrastructure programs had been 
achieved; militarily, NATO members by 1952 had been able to present some-
what of a common, integrated approach to any threats to their security. 
At this same conference the Council reorganized itself, which re-
sulted in the creation of a Secretariat composed of a Secretary and an 
international staff. Appointed by the Council for an unspecified time 
period, it is the Secretary's responsibility to preside over the Council 
and to direct the International Secretariat. 50 The Secretariat comprises 
several hundred individuals of whom many are permanently employed. Those 
not permanently employed are on loan from their governments and after a 
few years tour with NATO, return to their own countries. The secretariat 
has become essential to the overall effectiveness of NATO. With such di-
verse interests as " ••• long term studies of the economic capacities of 
members, research having a direct bearing on defense, technical services 
connected with armament production, political liaison, and production 
planning1151 the civilian side of NATO has become as much integrated, per-
haps more, than the military components. Its integrated character was 
recognized by General Ridgway, as SACEUR, when he stated : 
The organization of the civilian bodies of NATO has been 
progressively strengthened during the past year as a result 
of the creation of the position of Secretary-General as a 
focal point of civilian leadership •••• The North Atlantic 
Council, since the decision in early 1952 that it function 
50cottrell and Dougherty,~· cit., p. 38. 
51aall, • 60 
~· ~ · , p. • 
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in permanent sessions through the appointment of permanent 
representatives, has provided increasingls firm top-level 
direction to NATO, on a continuous basis. 2 
Also at the NATO Council meeting of February 1952, Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson commented on the axtent NATO had progressed: 
In building up their military forces, our European allies 
bad to start almost from scratch, but they have tackled the 
job with determination. Since 1949,·our allies in Europe have 
doubled their military budgets. Every one of them has length-
ened its period of military conscription. Military production 
in Europe has been. expanded almost four times beyond the 1949 
level. More than half a million men have already been added 
to their military forces on active duty. 53 
In his introductory remarks the Secretary further stated that " ••• the 
Supreme Commander must be assured of the largest number of effective com-
bat forces that can be developed this year". He established the basis 
for the future when he said, "The Allies wanted to lay the ground work 
for increases in 1953 and 1954",. 54 While the Korean War was still in 
progress, there was no assurances that the Soviet Union had relaxed its 
pressures on Europe. Within such an environment of hostility and fear, 
the Council proposed a force build-up that eventually gave impetus to 
the tightest aspect of military integration within the alliance--military 
units from West Germany. 
52General Matthew B. Ridgway, "Second Anniversary of SHAPE as an 
Operational Headquarters", Department~ State Bulletin, Vol. 28 (June 
29, 1953), p. 902. 
53 Dean Acheson, "NAC Meeting Strengthens Defense of North Atlantic 
Community", Department of State Bulletin, Vol 26 (March 10, 1952), 
p. 364. 
54Ibid. 
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Plans were made by the Council to train and equip 50 divisions55 in 
1952, 75 divisions in 1953, and to have available 96 divisions, reserve 
and regular, by 1954~ 56 Discounting the myriad of problems except the 
primary one, availability of manpower, the task of raising some one 
million men was indeed a formidable one. In order to raise 96 divisions 
NATO would require a contribution of twelve divisions from West Germany. 
Military Integration and the German Problem 
The official recognition of the need for German manpower in NATO 
may be dated from the 19~2 conference, but the " ••• goals endorsed at Lis-
.bon were the consummation of defense plans urged by the military since 
l94811 o 57 The United States from the outset believed that West German 
military units were " ••• an essential condition of American commitments11 
and the American military advisors did not believe " ••• an effective de= 
fense of the continent1158 was possible without the participation of the 
West Germans. The adoption of the "forward strategy',''· concept by NATO in 
September 1950 entailed the establishment of a defense line as far to 
the East as possible, preferably as far east as the Elbe River. Such de-
fense-in=depth would benefit NATO militarily, but for maximum effective-
ness it required participation by West German forces. 59 
55nDivision" size varies from nation to nation and also with a coun-
try0s national forces depending upon the primary function assigned to it 
but a 10,000 man average NATO division would bring the NATO armies to 
the planned goals. 
56 Osgood,~·~., p. 87. 
57 Ibid. 
58Moore, 2· ~q p. 37 o 
59cottrell and Dougherty,~· .s!!_., p. 177. 
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As early as 1948, the British were giving tacit recognition to the 
possibility of rearming West Germany. In April 1948 the Military Gover-
nor of the British occupational zone, Lieutenant General Brian Robertson, 
stated to the Diet of North Rhine Westphalia that " ••• a turning point 
had been reached in policies toward Germany; Germany would return to the 
family of nations" . The Governor further stated that " ••• the time has 
come to realize that the interest of all Europeans is converging. Our 
needs and your needs cannot be dealt with separately for we all form a 
part of Europe. 1160 
The British were not the only Euopeans who desired the West to re-
arm and to integrate its military forces with the other forces of Europe. 
I 
The following October the French Prime Minister, M. Rene Pleven secured 
a favorable vote from the French Assembly for his proposal n ••• of a Eur-
opean Army /West Germany included7 ••• which would be a complete merger of 
men and equipment under a single European political and military author-
•t II 61 l. y • This particular proposal launched the European Defense Community 
(EDC) which included the "Pleven Plan". 
The Pleven Plan reflected French recognition that West German man-
power was essential to the defense of Europe, and the planned implementa-
tion of it was an acknowledgement of French fear of German rearmament. 
While the Germans were to be rearmed, military integration, according 
to Pleven, would prevent Germany from turning its forces once again 
against France. The Plan proposed a European army in which German 
6°Konrad Adenauer, Konrad Adenauer Memiors 1945-53 (Chicago, 1965), 
pp. 108-09 . 
61 Ball, ~· cit., p. 28. 
military integration with the forces of other countries would exist at 
all echelons of command above the brigade levei . 62 The level of inte-
gration proposed is described by Robert Schuman:63 
This Treaty sets up a defense community and stipulated 
that the six existing armies are to be replaced by one com-
mon army •••• No element of the common army is at the dis-
posal of any government acting alone; all six must approve 
its use. Command is integrated on the model of the Atlantic 
Army of which the European Army will be one of the chief 
land forces. But in the European Army integration is car-
ried still further. Not only is the high command integrated, 
but the same is true of all units larger than a division, as 
well as of the services of supply and other auxiliary services, 
each will be composed of officers and men of different nation-
alities. There will be German soldiers but no German Army; 
German officers at every level but no German general staff; 
and the same will hold true for continental France and other 
signatory nations.64 
Schuman also said that " ••• we would have preferred to build up the eco-
nomic and political foundations a little further first before starting 
on the military structure /in German-f:.i. But we have no choice in the 
matter; our tasks have been imposed upon us. 1165 Very possibly the task 
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of rearming Germany had been "imposed" upon France but the method was to 
be of French choosing. Integration of German military forces was the 
French choice, not primarily for military considerations but for 
6211Brigade" is generally considered to have about one-half the num-
ber of men as a division but its size also varies from nation to nation 
and also the function assigned to it. Roughly, 5,000 men could be the 
strength of an average NATO brigade. 
63French Foreign Minister who had proposed the "Schuman Plan" which 
envisage the entire production of the French and German coal and steel 
industries integrated with one another. His plan eventually led to the 
establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. 
64Robert Schuman, "France and Europe", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 9 
(April, 1953), p. 355. 
65Quoted in F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and ~New Europe 
1945-63 (Stanford , 1965) , p. 130. 
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political expediency~ The Pleven Plan received serious consideration 
within French governmental agencies and was tentatively accepted by the 
other NATO allies as the basis of providing twelve German divisions. 
The adoption of the Pleven Plan would satisfy two demands: the Allies' 
insistance upon a German military contribution to European defense; and 
assurances that the complexities of military integration would not allow 
the proposed German forces to act without French approval. 
For the United States it was the Korean War that gave momentum for 
the creati.on of an integrated German military force. The frustrations 
experienced by the United States in its unsuccessful attempts to defeat 
the military forces of North Korea also directed the Americans' attention 
to the inadequacies of Western European defense. 66 During this period 
President Truman demanded that Europe arm sixty divisions, of which ten 
should be from Germany.67 
Germany recognized that any resurgence of its military forces would 
have to manifest itself as some form of integration with the military 
forces of Europe. James Richardson summarized the attitudes of the 
states involved in integrating German military forces: 
Before the North Korean attack the Schuman Plan had open-
ed the way to equality for Germany; after the attack, with the 
United States pressing foF German rearmament, equality could be 
expected as a natural concomitant of the new American policy ••• 
in the existing climate of opinion in Europe it was unthinkable 
that the GeI'mans should propose rearmament. As early as 1948 
there had been discussion in political circles in Germany as 
elsewhere, and /Chancellor/ Adenauer was reported to have ac-
cepted the view-current among the German military that thirty 
66Richard J. Barnet and Marcus G. Raskin, After 20 Years, Alter-
nates !2. ~ ~ !::: ~ Europe ( New York 11 1965) 11 p. 28. 
67Willis, 2£.• !:!!_., p. 131. 
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German divisions would be necessary. 68 
Within a few years after suffering defeat in World War II, came the pos-
si~ility for West Germany of ending an occupation that had been envis-
aged to last for years, perhaps generations. The probability of regain-
ing its sovereignty, and the possibility of rejoining the ''family of na-
tions" was within grasp for the Germans. To achieve these concessions 
from the recent conquerors and present military occupiers of Germany, 
Chancellor Adenauer accepted a number of inequalities that are still 
with the German nation. Adenauer believed that " ••• rearmament might be 
the way to gaining full sovereignty for the Federal Republic. This made 
it /rearmament/ the essential question of our political future. 1169 Al-
though the adoption of the Pleven Plan would leave Germany in a second 
class status within the military councils, Germany stood to gain much 
politically by making military units available to an integrated NATO. 
In August 1954, when EDC was presented to the French Assembly, it 
failed to be ratified. While elements in France had " ••• sought to spin 
out negotiations /of EDC/ as a delaying tactic, there was a surprising 
overall acceptance of supranationalizing even defense--the very essence 
of sovereigntyo1170 This "overall acceptance" became readily apparent 
when EDC failed in the French Assembly; within days another proposal for 
German rearmament and integration with NATO military forces was circula-
ted amongst the NATO capitals. Three months after the failure of EDC a 
68James L. Richardson, German and the Atlantic Alliance, The Inter-
action of Strategy and Politics Cambridge";- Massachusetts, 1966~pp. 
16-170 -
69Adenauer, !:?E.o cit., p . 270. 
70Timothy Wo Stanley, NATO in Transistion: 
tic Alliance (New York, 19655':-p:-45. 
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"looser structure" was planned that would revise the provisions of the 
Brussels Treaty of 1948 to include West Germany and Italy. This action 
ended the occupation regime and Germany became a sovereign member of the 
international community .. 71 Another modification of the Brussels Treaty 
was the relinquishment of some of its authority to NATO with the Brussels 
··. Treaty members' willi.ngness to "u .. rely on the appropriate Military Au-
thorities of NATO for informati.on and advice on military matters" .. 72 
At the same time the Brussels Treaty was revised the signatories 
also allowed Germany membership in NATO .. The results of these negotia-
tions, called the Paris Treaties 1 while allowing for the creation of 
German military. units, also imposed severe restrictions on the manufac-
ture of weapons for the German units. From the viewpoint of creating a 
supranational military force the protocols attached to the Paris Treat-
ies had far-reaching consequences for NATO members. Protocol No. III 
of the modified Brussels Treaty, renamed Western European Union after 
October 1954, prohibited Germany from manufacturing atomic, biological, 
or chemical weapons .. Also guided missiles, warships, and strategic bomb-
ers were not permissible in the German arsenal. After the ratification 
of the Paris Treaties in May 1955, many traditional rights of sovereign-
ty had been changed to adjust to the new organization: (1) determination 
of a nationis size of military forces, (2) control of types and stocks 
of armaments, (3) right ·of inspection on national territory and, (4) im-
portant decisions by majority voteo73 Within these restrictions, in May 
71cottrell and Dougherty,~ .. cit., pp. 180-81 .. 
72Article 3, Protocol Modifling ~Completing~ Brussels Treaty. 
Source: Treaty Series, Vol. 210_ New York, 1955), p. 346. 
73Robertson, ~ .. !:!!.•,pp .. 132-37 .. 
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1955, the Federal Republic of Germany was accepted into NATO as a member-
state.74 As expressed by Richardson, the German case, though somewhat 
special, i.s a vivid example of the impact of European military integra-
tion upon a nation's sovereignty: 
Germany has been the only member state willing to place 
the whole of its armed forces under NATO command ••• Germany ••• 
has held out the ideal of military integration as the goal 
appropriate to all NATO members. Further, by renouncing a 
national command structure or a General Staff and by encour-
aging logistic interdependence, especially with the United 
States forces, German policy has deliberately renounced 
options for independent military action ••• 75 
Structurally the members of NATO have integrated their war plans, 
command positions, logistical systems, and, to more or less degree vary-
ing with each nation, their military forces. Since its inception, NATO 
has " ••• transformed itself from a traditional alliance, implying little 
more than a commitment to stand together, to an integrated coalition 
76 
army." From an initial treaty declaration of " ••• considering an armed 
attack against one as being an attack on all ••• " it has developed into 
an organization that could influence the destinies of a large share of 
the world's population without full regard to the separate states that 
are its members. Within such a political-military environment problems 
are inevitable. 
74Lowenstein and von Zuhlsdorff, ~· cit., p. 81. 
75R• h d O 13 1.c arson,~·~·, p. • 
76Hilsman, ~" cit,,, p. 18. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION 
The position that the United States has occupied in NATO has been a 
direct reflection of its overall power vis-a-vis its NATO allies and the 
Soviet Union. As the only possessor of nuclear weapons and the economic 
capability to assist its postwar European allies in their reconstruction, 
the United States became the dominant member of the alliance. This dom-
ination of the alliance in its formative years by the Americans did not 
create too much concern on the part of the other allies because of more 
immediate problems, particularly of an economic nature, that were con-
stantly before them. To some degree the domination of the Americans with-
in the European security arrangements provided Western Europe with rela-
tively inexpensive security costs. If the basic premise of the alliance 
is correct in regards to the concept that its primary purpose is one of 
deterrence, then the American strategic forces bore the major burden of 
deterrence, at little financial cost to the allies. 
The needs of the Americans and Western Europeans were served by NATO 
during the first few years of its existence. For the United States, 
strategic bases close to the Soviet Union became available on a formal 
basis which increased American military capabilities; to the Western 
Europeans came the assurance that American nuclear forces would assist 
the NATO military forces should the alliance be activated for war. The 
Western Europeans also incurred risks inherent in placing NATO and 
48 
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American weapons of war directed at the Soviet Union on their territory~ 
Had the United States been able to maintain an absolute monopoly of 
nuclear weapons. NATO in all probability would have continued to function 
as it was originally created with the Americans contributing the largest 
share of money and equipment. and dominating the command positions and 
the formulation of plans. However, the development of Spviet nuclear 
weapons capable of destroying targets in the United States forced a re-
evaluation of NATO's usefulness by all of the allies. This issue has 
been considered with some degree of trepidation in the NATO .countries; 
victory or defeat is no longer the question--national survival is now the 
issue. Modern weapons have precluded the possibility of recovery always 
prevalent in the past; now there exists a probability that a nation may 
never have the opportunity to rebuild in the aftermath of a nuclear war. 
All the NATO allies are aware of these dangers and many have express-
ed doubts as to the practicality and feasibility of some of the integra-
ted aspects of the alliance. The control of nuclear weapons, implementa-
tion of battle plans, stationing of military forces and the formulation 
of strategy are but examples of a host of problems that have hampered 
formal mi;titary coordinati.on among NATO members. · The recent, and not so 
recent, a;t:.ti tude of France exemplifies, to a degree, the attitudes of 
other allies. Regardless of reason, the French withdrawal from the inte-
grated features of NATO can not but help to decrease the military effec-
tiveness of the alliance which, without doubt, affects the overall deter-
rence factor. France however, is not alone in advocating change in NATO. 
During the discussions of the aborted multilateral force Germany favored 
the proposals in order to change its inferior status regarding the con-
trol of nuclear weapons. Insistence on change has brought about 
dissension among members. With dissension has come a decrease and, in 
the case of France, a breakdown of formal military coordination among 
NATO members. 
Internal Problems of NATO 
The sources of dissension and the manner in which they manifest 
themselves are suggested by Claude: 
NATO has become an organizational web expressing and re-
inforcing the political determination of the United States to 
align itself definitively with the free nations of Europe in 
resistance to Soviet expansionism. Joint military action of 
the members of NATO is not so much a promise of their treaty 
as a premise of their organization.l 
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Immediately evident is the fact that the web has greatly favored the pol-
icies of one nation--the United States. At every level--civilian or 
military, policy or equipment, strategy or tactics--the United States has 
had the dominant role in NATO. Economic aid, equipment, commanders, mil-
itary assistance programs, nuclear weapons possession have all had their 
share in making the United States the dominant, and domineering member 
of NATO . The United States wields an inordinate measure of influence 
within the entire NATO structure. 
Membership on the Council allows the United States the opportunity 
to confront the decision-makers of the other fourteen members behind 
closed doors. Considering that all the other member-states were init-
ially recipients of American economic aid and military assistance, it is 
not surprising that Washington insisted upon, and undoubtedly success-
fully a large share of the time, conformity to its concept of defense 
1Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares The Problems and Pro-
gress of International OrganizationlN'ew York, 19561°7 p. 277. ~~ 
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for Western Europe. When the Mutual Defense Assistance Program of fiscal 
year 1952 was presented for discussion, President Truman explained that 
the """"bulk of these funds /$4 billions/ was to be used to strengthen 
the security of the North Atlantic area. 112 Congress insisted upon con-
ditions and restrictions before such a sum would be appropriated for the 
security of the North Atlantic area. From the initial appropriations 
for NATO there were strings attached to American monies. Conditions im-
posed upon aid recipients were specified as follows: 
Nations 
tively large 
expenditure" 
defense must 
receiving aid would be expected to devote a rela-
percentage of their national budget to military 
In order to achieve an economy of effort, self-
be organized on a collective, integrated basis.3 
Kurt Birrenbach describes NATO's most pressing probiem: 
Neither a strategy adjusted to military-technological 
evolution nor the reinforcement of nuclear and conventional 
forces can remove the uncertainties that beset the Western 
alliance" Among these uncertainties, the most harrowing is 
the unanswered question of the control of the use of nuclear 
weapons. It is the settlement of this issue that will large-
ly determine the political fortunes of NAT0. 4 
Many difficulties beset the alliance since its inception, but invariably 
most of the problems, if not resolved by time, were adjusted by military 
needs, political expediency, or some form.of accomodation effected for 
the purpose of harmony or cohesion. However, one problem has been exac-
erbated with the passage of time--decision-making concerning the strategy 
and tactics to be employed in the use of nuclear weapons. Recently 
2Robert H" Connery and Paul T. David, "The Mutual Defense Assist-
ance Program", The American Political Science Review, Vol. 45, No. 2 
(June, 1951), p~27. 
3Ibid", p. 328. 
4Kurt Birrenbach, The Future of the Atlantic Community, Toward 
European~American Partnership (New"'y'ork, London, 1963), pp. 10-11. 
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testifying before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, General Norstad 
explained the problem of nuclear control that has confronted, and is con-
fronting, NATO: 
Over the years, it has been said many times that the crux 
of this great problem of nuclear power and its military appli-
cation springs from questions concerning who has the authority 
and how that authority is, or should be exercised. Most 
Europeans ..... feel that they should have a voice in the politi-
cal process by which decisions will be taken governing the 
rise of weapons of this type--an influence, an appropriate 
measure of control. 5 
At NATO's beginning this problem was an academic one as only one nation 
possessed atomic weapons. but after the Soviet Union produced similar 
weapons and means of delivering them to Western European and American 
targets, the problem became very real and intense. 
Regardless of geographical, strategical, or military considerations, 
there is not a single national leader in the world who would volunteer 
his country to be used as a nuclear battlefield if there were any altern-
ative except surrender, and without doubt, many, perhaps most, would ac-
cept that condition in lieu of a nuclear war. Criticism could always 
be expected from some quarter no matter what strategy the planners pre-
sented as a counter to Soviet potential ventures. Since the United 
States initially possessed the only nuclear force--the Air Force's Stra-
tegic Air Command--and, it remained free of any NATO control, it was 
natural and logical that criticism, in or out bf NATO, directed at the 
use of this force would be lodged against the United States. While 
weapons do influence strategy, it is still men who must formulate it. 
5General Lauris Norstad, USAF, Ret., "The Crisis in NATO", Hearing 
Before House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 89th Congress, 2nd Session 
(May 25, 1966), p .. 222.-
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Determining the doctrine for the deployment of nuclear weapons was 
relatively simple some eighteen years ago but, since that time, the 
Soviet Union has emerged with equal weapons of destruction; also Great 
Britain and France have developed nuclear capabilities. The determina-
tion of nuclear strategy in NATO has become more complicated as a result. 
At the outset, unanimity on strategic doctrine was difficult to achieve 
among the military planners of NAT0. 6 The destructiveness of nuclear 
weapons made the issue of strategy much more complex and frightful be-
cause the planners were constantly confronted with the urgent problem 
of national survival . 7 Coupled with the problem of nuclear weapons has 
been the nature of the European to be wary of alliances, which compound-
ed the difficulty of developing strategy. Henry Kissinger wrote: 
Too many of them have seen alliances disintegrate not to 
be concerned over the impact of the unprecedented1stress of 
nuclear war on obligations incurred many years before under 
completely different circumstances. 8 ; 
Kissinger also pointed out that the United States was yery active in the 
immediate postwar years in assisting the development of non-military 
European institutions such as the Schuman Plan and the Common Market; 
however, in military matters the United States did not encourage a 
"o•oreal European sense of responsibility." The consequences were that 
NATO strategy, nuclear and otherwise, were based on ''more or less 
. 
6James L. Richardson, Germany and~ Atlantic Alliance, The Inter-
action .2!. Strategy~ Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 196617 p. 3. 
7Bernard Brodie, Strategy in ~ Missile ~ (Princeton, 1959) . See 
Chapter 59 "The Advent of Nuclear Weapons" for an excellent comparison of 
the potential destructiveness of nuclear weapons as opposed to the con-
ventional weapons deployed during World War II. 
8Henry A. Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership,~ Re-appraisal of 
the Atlantic Alliance (New"""¥ork, 1965), p. 94 . 
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unilateral American conceptions . 119 
Until the introduction of the Radford Plan10 in 1957, the keystone 
of Western strategy with respect to Western Europe was reliance on United 
States strategic bombing capability . 11 This bombing capability was the 
Strategic Air Command, which could only be activated by the President of 
the United States. Such a command arrangement left the security of West-
ern Europe in the hands of the United States. This arrangement assumed 
that European and American vital interests would always coincide in the 
event of Soviet aggression . Thus, NATO nuclear strategy was not only 
determi ned by NATO planners, who were mostly American, but the ultimate 
decision t o use nuclear weapons was exclusively American. 
After the initial introduction of nuclear weapons in NATO in 1954,12 
there was a great deal of fear among the Europeans that the United 
States would reduce its forces in Europe. 13 Another source of fric-
tion with the advent of nuclear weapons in the NATO inventory was that 
their actual utili zation remained unknown to non-American commanders . 
9Kissinger, ~· cit . , pp . 94- 5. 
lOA proposal endorsed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Admiral Arthur w. Radford predicated on the proposition that convention-
al war was no longer a possibility with the Soviet Union; hence, the 
introduction of tactical nuclear weapons on a large scale into the NATO 
arsenal s whi ch would enable subsequent reductions in American military 
forces . 
11George H. Rathjens, Jr . , "NATO Strategy: Total War", NATO and 
American Security, Klaus Knorr, ed. (Princeton, New Jersey,--r§s9T;-
P• 66 . 
12The 85 ton, 280 mm . atomic cannon arrived in Europe in October 
1953 and rockets and missiles (Honest John, Corporal, Matador, and Regu-
lus ) armed with atomic warheads arrived the following spring and summer. 
See Robert Endicott Osgood, NATO,!!!!:_ Entangling Alliance (Chicago and 
Toronto, 1962 ) 9 p . 107 . 
13rbid . , p. 108 . 
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The Atomic Energy Act of 194614 specifically forbade the sharing of any 
atomic information with the European allies; this legislation created an 
absurd situation: Marshal Alphonse Juin, a French citizen, who also was 
Commander of Allied Forces Central Europe,15 was not permitted to know 
the type and quantity of atomic weapons at his disposai. 16 In time the 
MacMahon Act was changed to permit " ••• information about nuclear weapons 
to be disclosed to an allied country which had already made substantial 
progress in the development of such weapons." The only nation in 1958 
to have made "substantial progress" was Britain; the change was purpose-
ly written to dampen nuclear proliferation but its consequencea merely 
antagonized France.17 To this day France has not received any assist-
ance from the United States in the development of its nuclear weapons. 
This a.spect of secrecy concerning the di.ssemination of American nu-
clear knowledge has been a constant source of frustration and bitterness 
for the French. Discussing a manufacturing plant that produces pluton-
ium for French atomic bombs, a spokesman18 for the French atomic pro-
gram explained: 
14commonly referred to as the MacMahon Act after its sponsor, Sena-
tor MacMahon. 
15Allied Forces Central Europe is a subordinate command of SHAPE 
and most probably would engage the enemy first and would endure the 
most massive attacks as its areas border East Germany. 
16osgood, ~· .=!!_., p. 106. 
17F. w. Mulley, The Politics of Western Defense (New York, 1962), 
p. 81.. 
18Mr. Bertrand Goldschmidt, officer-in-charge of foreign relations 
for the French Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique. 
We naturally considered asking help from our American and 
British friends when we embarked on this programme •••• The ini-
tial reaction of the British was favourable, and then we were 
quickly told that thi.s was not . possible because it was against 
the spirit of the Quebec agreement, in which Amex-icans and 
Britons and Canadians have agreed never to help another coun-
try in the military field without the consensus of the two 
others. 19 
Not only in the development of atomic bombs have the French been forced 
to act independently of the other NATO allies, but also they have been 
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forced into expensive duplication efforts in the construction of nuclear 
submarines. To the French, all of this secrecy, especially since Britain 
has been able to share American atomic secrets and save tremendous costs 
in the creation of their independent nuclear forces, has " ••• served as 
an additional grievance against the special Anglo-American partnership. 1120 
The French subscribe to the theory that he who controls the nuclear 
weapons shall also determine the strategy in their use. 21 It was appar-
ent to the Western Europeans that the control of nuclear weapons was es-
sential to the exercise of leadership in the alliance. Raymond Aron 
describes the importance that France placed on nuclear weapons: 
Either France was to have along with the Americans and 
the English, a major voice, a special responsibility, and an 
exceptional role in leading the West, or it would withdraw 
from NATO, remove its troops from the common organization, 
and take over responsibility for the essential ~art of its 
own defense by creating its own atomic force ••• 2 
After French atomic forces were technically assured of becoming a reality 
19quoted in Roy Batterby, "French Eyes on the Future", Survival, 
Volo 7, No. 6 (September, 1965), p. 222. 
20osgood, ~· .=.!!.•, p. 218. 
21Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessit! for Choice. Prospects of 
American Foreign Policy (Ne;-york, 1961 .~ 111. 
22Robert Aron, ~ Explanation ~~Gaulle, Marianne Sinclair, tr. 
(New York, 1966), p. 158. 
in 1958, de Gaulle became more amenable to cooperating with the NATO 
allieso Speaking before the future military officers of France at the 
V Ecole de Guerre, he stated: 
It goes without saying that our defense, the mobilization 
of our means, the way in which the conduct of war is conceived 
--all this must be combined for us with what exists in other 
countrieso Our strategy must be joined with the strategy of 
others. On the battlefields, there is every probability that 
we would find ourselves side by side with our allies.23 
De Gaulle has continually stressed that the 11 0 •• Atlantic Alliance is 
absolutely necessary", th.at the actions of the allies should be in con-
cert, and if war should come, all " ••• should combine their efforts". 
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However, he has resisted the dominance of the United States over nuclear 
strategy, and has insisted that the security of France requires French 
nuclear weapons, asserting that France must " .... retain her will, her 
countenance and her army".24 
·The Problem of Further Integration 
The United States and to a certain extent Great Britain 
have taken over the task of developing, preparing, and using 
primarily offensive strategic weapons, including nuclear 
weapons, because these countries have the greatest military 
economic, and technical potential ••• 
The American imperialists, who have all the strategic 
weapons at their disposal, exert political and military 
pressure on their allies to force them to pursue policies 
advantageous to the United States. 2 5 · .,,:'io 
····,;,l 
Though the above passage is cloaked with propagandi~~ic terminology, 
23charles de Gaulle in a speech made November 3, 1959, quoted in 
Roy c. Macridis, ~Gaulle Implacable Ally (New York, 1966), p. 134. 
24charles de Gualle in a speech made November 23, 1961, quoted in 
Ibid., pp. 136-37. 
25v. D. Soklovskii, Soviet Military Strategy, Herbert s. Dinerstein 
and others, tr. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1963), p. 168. 
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there are elements of truth within it. For purposes of this study an 
examination of one of the policies that was to be "advantageous to the 
United States is presented--the multilateral force. 
The Allies differ in their interpretation of the most basic issue--
the use of weapons. Henry Kissinger explained that the fundamental dif-
ferences among them are ''philosophical", and he outlined these differ-
ences as they pertain to the French and American concept of NATO: 
Washington urges a structure which makes separate action 
physically impossible by assigning each partner a portion of 
the over-all task. Paris insists that a consensus is meaning-
ful only if each partner has a real choice •••• In its /Wash-
ington7view, influence is proportionate to a nation's-contri-
bution to a common effort, somewhat like share-owning in a 
stock company.26 
On the basis of share-owning it is not difficult for the United States 
to expect to control the "company" as its shares coupled with two other 
major partners, Great Britain and Germany, represent an overwhelmingly 
majority of interests. What, though, are the results when the majority 
stockholders desire to pursue a particular course of action that is con-
trary to the wishes of the minority? Very possibly ten or fifteen years 
ago the majority--United States definition of majority--would have car-
ried the issue but not so today. 
In 1960 the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Norstad, pro-
posed that NATO should become the fourth nuclear power in order to give 
the alliance control of the nuclear components now held in exclusive 
United States custody. 27 In anticipation of problems in the creation of 
26Kissinger, ~ Troubled Partnership, 2• .s.f!.• , p. 46. 
27Timothy W. Stanley, NATO in Transition: The Future of the Atlan-
tic Alliance (New York, Washington, London, 196"sf;" p. 199.~----
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a multilateral atomic authority, General Norstad was very cautious in 
his assessment of the requirements of such a force that he stated: 
••• for the alliance to have continuing life and meaning, 
it needs increasing authority; it needs power of some form. 
If politically feasible, action to pass to the alliance 
greater control over atomic weapons and to subject their use 
more directly to the collective will could be a great and 
dramatic new step.28 
The members were not able to find a common basis for agreement on the 
proposal because of the lack of consensus concerning how to place 
"fifteen fingers on the trigger". The proposal did not progress beyond 
29 the discussion stage . The failure of this proposal was indicative of 
. , .. ,. 
the results of future plans that attempted to serv~ conflicting nuclear 
interests among the members of NATO. 
To some extent the most serious proposal for creating a multilateral 
atomic authority within NATO was an outgro"{th oi British faH.ur~S .·iQQ per- . 
feet nuclear capabilities comparable .to the defenses of the Soviet Union. 
Possessing fission_ weapons in -1952 and thermonuclear ones in 1957, the 
British depended· upon · their V-bombers (Vulcan , Victor, and Valiant) to 
deliver· their nuclear weapons. __ Soviet technological advances in anti-
aircraft defenses decreased measurably the proposed effectiveness of the 
British bombing force . To counter modern Soviet defenses the British 
attempted to develop the Blue Streak30 which, after enormous expenditures , 
28Quoted in Mulley, ~· .sl!_., p. 95. 
29Alvin J . Cottrell and James E. Dougherty, The Politics of the 
Atlantic Alliance (New York, London, 1964), p. 10S:- ~~ 
30Blue Streak was a British intermediate-range ballistic missile 
(IRBM) that was to be armed with a nuclear warhead. Designed with a -
"soft"--above ground--launching pad it would not withstand the pres-
sures encountered by an enemy's near-miss nuclear attack . 
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was cancelled for fear it would become obsolescent before, or immediate-
ly after, it became operational. Great Britain turned to the American 
Skybolt31 as a substitute for its defunct Blue Streak project. After in-
vesting some 25 million dollars to assist American development of the 
Skybolt, the United States cancelled the project. Consequently, the 
British had nuclear weapons but no effective delivery system. 32 
At a meeting in Nassau in December 1962, Prime Minister Harold Mac-
millan was responsive to President Kennedy's offer of Polaris33 missiles 
for British submarines. The Prime Minister also accepted the principle 
of "indivisibility of strategic defense", which committed the nuclear 
force of Britain to NATO control. The Nassau Agreement provided the 
framework for future discussions concerning multilateral control of nu-
clear weapons in NATO; it was also the initial attempt to fulfill"••• 
the American quest for the integration of all the nuclear forces of the 
Alliance1134 which were to include the British Bomber Command, British 
Polaris missiles, and some but not all, of the American Polaris weapons. 
For the proposed atomic force to become a reality it would require 
31Skybolt was a United States air-to-surface missile consisting of 
a two-stage, solid propellant plant. It was designed to be air-launched 
from strategic bombers at a distance estimated at one thousand miles 
from the enemy target. With its hypersonic speed, mobility, and range 
it could have increased the effectiveness of British V-bombers immeasur-
ablyo 
32stanley, ~o cit., pp. 164-67. 
33Polaris - - United States surface-to-surface (sub-surface if launch-
ed by submarine) two-stage, solid propellant ballistic missile directed 
by an inertial guidance system that is capable of putting it "on target" 
at a distance of approximately 1500 miles. Since the Nassau Agreement 
the range of the Polaris has been extended to 3,000 miles. 
34K• · · 82 1ss1nger, ,2o ,S!;,!_. , p • • 
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the nuclear forces of France to be included. The United States attempt-
ed to effect this by offering France the opportunity to buy Polaris mis-
siles on the same terms that had been offered to the British. This, of 
course, would entail the same controls. France, however, refused the 
offero De Gaulle's view of the proposal was one of suspicion and dis-
trusto Pragmatically he expressed the French position as follows: 
France has taken note of the Anglo-American Nassau agree-
ment . As it was conceived, undoubtedly no one will be surprised 
that we cannot subscribe to it. It truly would not be useful 
for us to buy Polaris missiles when we have neither the sub-
marines to launch them nor the thermonuclear warheads to arm 
them. 35 
He amplified his remarks to include his personal feelings in regards to 
the concept: 
••• this multilateral force necessarily entails a web of 
liaisons, transmissions and interferences within itself, and 
on the outside a ring of obligations such that, if an integral 
part were. suddenly snatched from it, there would be a strong 
risk of paralyzing it just at the moment, perhaps, when it 
should act.36 
Not to be disuaded by French reluctance, the United States propos-
ed a multilateral submarine fleet manned by NATO forces; in time the 
proposal was modified to be a fleet of twenty-five surface vessels that 
would be armed with Polaris missiles. The feasibility of such a "mix-
master" force was debated in every NATO capital, the United States in-
eluded. Militarily the idea, had it materialized, would have added 
35 Charles de Gaulle at a press conference on January 14, 1963, 
Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de 
Gaulle May 19, 1958--Ja uary'""3I", 1964 (New York, 1964), p. 219. Here:-
after cited as Major Addresses. 
36Ibid. 
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hundreds of missiles mounted on a mobile launching platform which, with-
out doubt, would have compounded Soviet defensive measures; but the con-
cept never went beyond the state of military planning because of the 
following reason : 
••• it can be said that the problem of sharing the control 
of nuclear weapons is an extremely complex one, and raises po-
litical and military issues of the most subtle nature . For the 
most part, political considerations rather than purely military 
ones will determine whether or not a European deterrent force 
will §ome into being and what its character will be if it 
does . 7 
After French refusal to participate in any NATO multilateral nuclear 
force, i t was apparent that no further military integration within NATO 
was to be accomplished . Perhaps President de Gaulle sounded the death 
knell to present, and future, attempts of military integration when he 
stated : 
•• • the concept of a war or even of a battle in which France 
would no longer be herself and would no longer be acting in her 
own behalf, with a part to play all her own, and in accordance 
with what she wants--such a concept cannot be accepted ••• this 
system of integration has had its day . 38 
Dissension Within NATO 
France wants to retrieve the command of its own forces, decide its 
own defenses, and determine its own military strategy independently of 
NATO . However, French leaders profess that they are willing to commit 
France to concerted efforts in defense of the North Atlantic region, but 
not within a highly integrated military structure. 
37cottrell and Dougherty,~· cit., p. 107 . 
38Charles de Gaulle in a speech made November 3, 1959, quoted in 
Macrides, ~ o ci t., pp . 134- 34 . 
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For the United States, "independent" military forces are not com-
patible with the purposes of the alliance. It is ironical that a major 
share of the current dissension between the United States and France 
rests upon differences over this issue. Since the appointment of Eisen-
hower as Supreme Commander in 1950, French forces have been expected to 
serve under the American commander, but not the reverse--American units 
will not take orders from French commanders apart from NATO. The fol-
lowing French demand fell on deaf ears: 
••• to recover the full exercise of its sovereignty on 
French territory, in other words, no longer to accept the 
presence of foreign units, installations or bases in France 
falling in any respect under the control of authorities other 
than the French authorities.39 
To prevent American military forces from coming under the control of 
French authorities, 30,000 American military personnel are currently 
leaving France; this movement of men and installations is estimated to 
cost more than one billion dollars. 40 Why, at this time, has France 
placed the Alliance in a position of spending an extra billion dollars; 
why has France refused to integrate its military forces with its NATO 
allies? What changes have occurred to make one ally adopt such diver-
gent policies? Perhaps Ronald Steele is correct in his observations of 
French feelings: 
The integrated military alliance we built was the guarantee 
of their security; but at the same time it was the final mark of 
their fall from world power. The small armies they assembled 
were but token forces by which they could display their allegi-
ances to an alliance whose only meaning rested on America's 
3911 French Aide-MJmoire to the Fourteen Other NATO Members (March 
10)", ~ Letter, Vol. 14, No. 5 (May, 1966), p. 24. 
4011NATO Without France--de Gaulle Forces U. S. to Showdown in Eur-
ope", ~ · ~~World Report, Vol. 60, No. 13 (March 21, 1966), p. 
44. 
promise to protect them. Nations which but a decade before 
had been the arbiters of the World and the rulers of half of 
mankind found themselves totally dependent on the United 
States for their survival. Rarely have the mighty fallen 
so far in so short a time; and, having fallen, rarely do 
the once-mighty look benignly upon their successors. 41 
The recent French reaction to NATO has been publicly blamed on de 
Gaulle . In answer to a question posed by the Chairman of the Subcom-
mittee on Europe, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the United States 
Ambassador to France spoke of French policy in the following manner: 
In regard to the question that you asked me as to how 
this French attitude toward NATO developed, I think we can 
say without any question at all that it represents the ideas 
of General de Gaulle . His views particularly on foreign poli-
cy are dominant in the French Government •••• You can go back 
as far as 1957, I think, where he has termed himself against 
the integration of NATO . One of his particular planks, you 
might say, in his platform when he returned to power in 1958, 
was that the Government of the Fourth Republic permitted 
France to be ' taken over ' as it were by the United States. 42 
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It cannot be said that President de Gaulle's actions with respect to the 
demand that all foreign troops stationed on French soil be placed under 
French Command by March 1967 came unexpectedly. 43 France had for years 
been requesting changes within NATO that would better reflect its lead-
ership's interpretation of French interests . General Norstad commented 
on this point : 
41 Ronald Steele, ~~of Alliance : America and the Future (New 
York, 1964), P o 29 ~ 
42 Charles E. Bohlen, United States Ambassador to France for the 
past three years, "The Crisis in NATO", 2£.· cit., pp . 3-4. 
43 In his letter of March 7, 1966 to President Johnson, de Gaulle 
states, "France intends to •• • terminate her participation in the 'inte-
grated ' commands, and no longer to place forces at the disposal of 
NATO" . See Ibid . , pp . 59-60 . 
We tend to think of this threat as being recent and French. 
By withdrawing his forces from NATO and evicting our forces 
from France, General de Gaulle is rapidly assuming, in the pub-
lic mind, responsibility for most of the ills from which the 
Alliance suffers. That General de Gaulle has added mightily to 
the problems within the Alliance needs no reaffirmation, no re-
petition; but to assign to him all responsibility may be a 
serious and dangerous oversimplification. In fact, doubts and 
questions, threats and attacks, have not been limited to the 
last few months; they have been going on for some years now. 44 
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Distrust of American intentions have been more pronounced since the 
development of Soviet hydrogen weapons in 1953 and a subsequent delivery 
system as dramatized by Sputnik in 1957, however this distrust of the 
French President dates back further than the advent of Soviet nuclear 
weapons. Fighting the major share of World War II from exile, General 
de Gaulle had first-hand experience in the ways and means of liberating 
his homeland~ The seeds of distrust could have been implanted by his 
wartime experiences with his allies, Great Britain and the United States. 
Giving as reasons why he distrusts these two countries, Aron states: 
••• it is because he /de Gaulle/ realized, in his dealings 
with the English, that they, too, have one permanent trait: 
they are Machiavellis, cloaked in courtesy and decked out with 
friendliness, and he is sure that the inner feelings and the 
outer behavior of the English will never alter ••• 
In the case of the United States, there is no Machiavell-
ianism. Perhaps American policy could rather be called too 
unsubtle and too naive.45 
Regardless of the exact time of the implantation of the seeds of distrust 
there has been continuity in his feelings. In the fall of 1948, six 
months before the creation of NATO, General de Gaulle criticized the mil-
i~ary arrangements of the Brussels Treaty of which the United States was 
44Ibid., p. 222. 
45 Aron,~·~., pp . 146, 151. 
not a member but was still more than an observer. 46 It was his convic-
tion that both Great Britain and the United States would be " ••• content 
to conduct the defense of Europe behind the Continent or behind the 
47 Pyrennes". There is the possibility, perhaps probability, that this 
was the battle plan as determined by the Anglo-American planning staffs 
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of that time; French thinking could not be responsive to the idea of the 
next battlefield being France. To some degree this apprehension per-
vades French military outlook to the present time. 
It is mutual interest that the entire allian~e is based upon but 
for the allies, France included, a question concerning the mutuality of 
interest has arisen since the Soviet Union has achieved parity in nuclear 
weapons with the United States. France, and the other allies to ales-
ser extent, fear that the United States would not respond with massive 
nuclear retaliatory forces against Soviet actions directed only at West-
ern Europe because of the possible destruction of American targets by 
Soviet forces. Distrust is also prevalent in the opposite circumstances 
--should the United States engage in a nuclear exchange with the Soviet 
Union, contrary to Western European wishes, there is an excellent possi-
bility that the NATO allies would also become unwilling participants in 
a war of annihilation. Both issues, to fight or not to fight, become a 
matter of trust for the allies, but the United States, as the possessor 
of the majority of weapons, does not have to place the same degree of 
trust in its allies. Osgood states the allies' position in this matter 
as a " ••• simple principle that there should be no annihilation without 
46M. Margaret Ball,~~!!!!:. Etlropean Union Movement (New York, 
1959), p. 11 
47The New York Times, October 2, 1948, pp. l, 3. 
------
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represen.tation11 • 48 
It is the French, more than the other allies, who have vocalized 
their opposition to NATO nuclear strategy and its formulation. The 
French contend, and rightly so, that the disproportionate number of 
Americans i n the top military command positions have resulted in the 
major decisions being made by the United States. Examining the composi-
tion of Supreme Allied Headquarters Europe (SHAPE), one may easily con-
elude that " • •• it is largely what the public thinks it is: an American 
general staff". The French officers within NATO also charge that the 
" ••• paucity of information made available to the representatives" of 
France and other NATO members contributes to the American monopoly of 
decisions, nuclear and otherwise. 49 The French also contend that since 
two-thirds of the representatives of the Standing Group are but " • •• a 
continuation of the wartime Anglo-American partnership", France has 
never attained equality with either of the other members. 50 
Not only do the organizational aspects of NATO cause dissension 
but the problem of command and control is of concern to the allies, es-
pecially France. These problems of command and control of strategy and 
weapons have manifested themselves over the years in actions contrary to 
the purposes of NATO. In support of the concept of "forward strategy" 
NATO planners envisaged in 1957 that low-yield atomic weapons delivered 
by t acti cal ai rcraft and American strategic bombers would be required to 
48osgood, ~ · cit., p. 59. 
49Edgar s. Furniss, Jr., France T~oubled Ally, de Gaulle's Heritage 
~ Prospects (New York , 1960), p. 282 . 
SOibid., p. 280 . 
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defend Europe. France, among others, made bases available on its terri-
tory for this purpose51 but in time withdrew the use of its bases from 
all American aircraft carrying atomic or nuclear weapons. Similar 
French response was accorded the American offer to place Polaris missiles 
on French soil because the United States would not relinquish control of 
the warheads or the delivery means. 52 
In accepting the responsibility " ••• for the unity, integrity, and 
independence of France", President de Gaulle referred to French forces 
in NATO as the "means for action" to put down the Nationalist rebellion 
in Algeria in 1958. 53 The bulk of French forces in NATO had been with-
drawn to fight in Algeria54 and were never returned to NATO, even though 
NATO requested that they be returned. In 1959 the French fleet units 
were withdrawn from NATO naval units in the Mediterranean; the same type 
withdrawal occurred in 1963 from the Atlantic fleet units of NATO. The 
six French divisions assigned to SACEUR were decreased by sixty-six per-
cent. American tactical air squadrons were re-deployed to Great Britain 
and Germany because of French refusal to permit nuclear weapons to be 
stored on French soil . The French air defense system, in part, has been 
removed from the integrated air defense of the NATO countries throughout 
Western Europe . 55 
These listed French that were considered to be detrimental to the 
51Ben T. Moore,~~~ Future~ Europe (New York, 1958), p. 7. 
52osgood, ~· =.!!_., p. 223 . 
53Major Addresses, p . 7. 
54 · • Moore, ~ · ~ · , p . 7. 
55Claude Witze, "NATO--New Deal or Fast Shuffle", Air Force and 
Space Digest, Vol . 49, No . 4 (April, 1966), p. 14. 
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effectiveness of military coordination were explained somewhat by Presi-
de.nt de Gaulle: 
The defense of France must be French. That is a necessity 
which has not always been too well understood in recent years. 
I know this. It is absolutely essential that it become recog-
nized once more. With a country like France, if war should 
come, then that war must be her war. Its effort must be her 
effort. 56 
But in justifying his actions in the creation of an independent nuclear 
force, contrary to NATO's desires, the French President was more Mach-
iavellian inclined when he said: 
Who can say that in the future, the political background 
having changed completely--that is something that has already 
happened on earth--the two powers having the nuclear monopoly 
will not agree to divide the world? •••• And who can even say 
that the two rivals, after I know not what political and soc-
ial upheaval, will not unite?57 
There is little doubt that the French do not trust the American response 
to the security needs of France since it is the function of every politi-
cal leader to prepare and protect his country against all dangers, no 
matter how remote. 
In the same letter to President Johnson in which the French Presi-
dent stated his intentions to " ••• no longer place forces at the disposal 
of NATO" he was also adamant in ensuring that the alliance survive but 
in a different form . President de Gaulle spoke of the " ••• solidarity of 
defense" created by NATO, and that France should remain a " ••• party to 
the treaty signed at Washington11 .58 Of particular note is the French 
willingness to remain a member of the Treaty but not the Organization. 
56Quoted in Macridis, ~· cit., p. 133. 
57The ~~Times, November 11, 1959, p. 10. 
5811Tb C • • ' NATO" ' 59 e r1.s1.s in , £E.• cit. , p. • 
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The French are merely abrogating the Organization that has plagued them 
for years, an organization that has afforded them ceremonial distinction 
but at a sacrifice of political flexibility and military independence. 
He not only intends to adhere to the treaty provisions but he also has 
no intention of completely divorcing his military forces from the other 
integrated forces of NATO. In a note to all the NATO members President 
de Gaulle stated that " • • • it would be advisable, after the termination 
of French participation, to establish liaison missions" with the various 
military commands of NATO; he went on to say that these missions would 
be helpful in planning the use of French forces during " • •• the time of 
war in joint military operations . 1159 
However, the French are emphatic in their views regarding the inte-
grated aspects of NATO . In a recent speech Premier Pompidou referred to 
the problem that military integration might involve France in " ••• a war 
that would not be ours" for reasons " ••• alien to the interests of France". 
He further referred to the present state of military integration as being 
" ••• the daughter of the cold war and helps to perpetuate it11 •60 Removal 
of army divisions, fleet units, and aircraft squadrons, and the refusal 
to participate in military training exercises, and the request that all 
military foreigners leave France, requires one to conclude that France's 
position in NATO is not one of complete and full membership. These re-
cent French acti ons are a culmination of a series of efforts over a per-
iod of years to change the integrated character of the alliance . 
59 
"Second French Aide-Memoire to the Other NATO Members (March 29)", 
~ Letter, Vol . 14, No. 5 (May, 1966), p. 24. 
60
~eorges Pompidou~ ~ Texts 2f. the Statement'sj ~ Foreign Polici 
~ Premier.Georges Pompidou Before~ French National Assembly ~April 
£~April 3£,, 1960, No. 243A and 245A, (April, 1966), p. s. 
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There have been major adjustments in both NATO policies and struc-
ture in the past, but none of such magnitude as presently proposed. Os-
good summarized the problem in the following manner : 
• • • the economic and political resurgence of Western Eur-
ope now challenge the very foundation of effective collabora-
tion, the basic political and military assumptions upon which 
the alliance was constructed. At the same time, these porten-
tous developments raise fundamental questions about the util-
ity and the vitality of such a tightly knit regional 
11 • 61 a iance ••• 
Assuming that the Soviet threat has not diminished, and this study does 
make that assumption, i t becomes imperative for all NATO members to seek 
and find a new basis for cooperation. There must be recognition by all 
members t hat the viability of the alliance depends upon " ••• sustaining 
allied cohesion • • • to meet the requirements of deterrence and defense 11 • 62 
Exactly what are the requirements of deterrence and defense? It 
is on this question that NATO is floundering. Military requirements are 
predicated upon many variable factors, but eventually they become limi-
ted by two fundamentals--the threat, apparent or potential, and a na-
tion's capabilities . Obviously both of these fundamentals are in a con-
stant state of flux, and it is with this backdrop that President de 
Gaul le has steered NATO into shallow, but not necessarily dangerous, 
waters . His recent actions have forced the helmsman--the United States 
- -and the oarsmen of NATO to be more aware of changes in the internation-
al current s and the not-so-hidden reefs that exist should the present 
course of NATO not be altered. 
The reaction of France has been public and clear. Other nations of 
61osgood, .2• cit . , p. 3 . 
62 rhi d . , p . ?.3 . 
NATO have expressed concern more subtly, or with less public attention. 
A Soviet military writer has given assurances that other nations will 
follow the lead of France: 
Today it is France that attacks the U.S. positions. But 
it will not be long before West Germany, seeking as it does 
to seize leadership in Western Europe, appropriates the key 
posts in the major bodies and intercepts the initiative in 
determining the policies and military strategy of the bloc, 
also pitches into attack.63 
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That Germany does seek leadership is undeniable. Evidence points to the 
desire of the Germans to "intercept the initiative" and become a more 
dominant spokesman in NATO affairs. It is probably true that Germany 
also is restless with the United States' dominance of the integrated as-
pects of NATO. However, Hans Morgenthau has written that Germany would 
be more powerful within the alliance without France because of its mili-
tary strength: 
The German Army is today the backbone of the ground forces 
of NATO. In view of the defection of France and the military 
weakness of the other European allies, NATO tends to become the 
organizational structure for what is in substance an American-
German alliance.64 
Coupled with the idea that Germany is the strongest member of NATO 
potentially, except for the United States, is the fact that Germany is 
the only country in the world not allowed to have an independent nuclear 
force. These forces have not failed to make their mark on German lead-
ership. Fritz Erler, the floor leader in the Bundestag, recently reflec-
ted this problem when he expressed the feelings of many Germans about 
63N. Andreyev, "NATO's Role in Europe", Survival, Vol. 8 (May, 
1966), p. 155. 
64Hans J. Morgenthau, "Germany Gives Rise to Vast Uncertainties", 
~New~ Times Magazine (September 8, 1963), p. 21. 
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nuclear weapons that " ••• it would be impossible to exclude forever one 
country alone without creating feelings of frustration that would lead 
to violent nationalism11 • 65 He also stated a problem causing concern in 
Germany that was troublesome to France: "For years I have urged that the 
European partners in NATO be given a share in planning, in deciding on 
common strategy, in preparing future weapons developments and similar 
matters ••• 11 • 66 
The same problems of planning, weapons, and strategy that drove 
France from the alliance are also of concern to political leaders in 
Germany. German politics may also be reflecting this problem. In re-
cent elections in Bavaria and Hesse, the National Democratic Party, an 
extreme nationalist group, made significant gains. This party is against 
NATO, anti-American, and willing to pursue a strictly nationalist foreign 
policy. 67 Probably these foreign policy aims were significant to German 
voters. While most European members realistically accept subordination 
to American leadership, they are sensitive that their opinions be respec-
ted in the planning chambers of NATO. They would like to have a voice 
in the formulation of strategy, particularly nuclear strategy. 68 
Franz Josef Strauss stated in April, 1966 that the problem of NATO 
re-organization was "pressing" because serious consideration had never 
65Fritz Erler, "The Alliance and the Future of Germany", Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 43 (April, 1965), p. 442. 
66Ibid . 
67Roscoe Drummond, "Contagious Nationalism", The Christian Science 
Monitor (December s, 1966),. p. 18. 
68 Theo Sommer, "For an Atlantic Future", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43 
(October, 1964), p . 117. 
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been given to updating the structure. Since the Americans were " ••• ab-
solutely satisfied with the existing situation" and the Europeans would 
not act, there was little likelihood of change. He expressed the opin-· 
ion that the lead set by France will undoubtedly call for reorganization 
of the NATO framework. In the same interview, Mr. Strauss recommended 
a change in composition and function of the Standing Group to better re-
flect German interests. 69 
All of the American allies in NATO have experienced problems caused 
by the integrated features of the alliance. By virtue of being the strong-
est member, the United States has created and perpetuated many of these 
problems in NATO. France warned the members of the alliance, by word and 
action, that changes in the integrated features of NATO must be made. 
Not receiving the desired response, France initiated actions to bring 
about change. Germany, confronted with similar frustrations, might pur-
sue a like course which could result in a further weakening of the deter-
rence factor of the alliance and the defense posture of the United States. 
6911Time to Start U.S. Pullback in Europe?" U.S. News and World 
Report, Vol. 60 (April 18, 1966), p. 70. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
World War II involved the United States in global affairs to the 
extent that it was impossible to withdraw into isolation upon the term-
ination of hostilities. Great hope was placed in the United Nations and 
cooperation among the major powers for the solution of major conflicts 
of interests among states. However, it was not long after the war be-
fore relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union reach-
ed a point where wartime cooperation could not continue and the United 
Nations could not live up to expectations. The United States and the 
Soviet Union began to construct alliances against each other and to com-
pete for the support of the so-called uncommitted world. 
In Europe the United States became concerned with the position of 
power established by the Soviet Union as a result of World War II, and 
feared that the security of Western Europe was threatened. The United 
States throughout the twentieth century looked upon Europe as being im-
portant to its own security. Twice Germany was fought to prevent it 
from dominating the continent; now it was feared that the Soviet Union 
might attempt the same thing. The power potential of Western Europe 
added to that of the Soviet Union would constitute, in the view of the 
United States. a serious security problem. Western European leaderships 
had a mutual interest in resisting any Soviet expansionist effort, there-
fore, they willingly allied with the United States in NATO to develop a 
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military deterrent to discourage any aggression. These same leaders 
were also dependent upon the United States for economic assistance to 
reconstruct their war torn economies. 
This dependence--economic and military--gave the United States an 
inordinate amount of power in European affairs, which was exercised to 
the point of eventually frustrating many of the European states. The 
United States insisted that Western Europe unify militarily, economi-
cally, and politically . Not only would such developments contribute to 
deterrence of the Soviet Union, but they woul d constitute a means by 
which Germany could be prevented from becoming a future menace. 
Thi s study has been concerned primarily with United States military 
policy in Europe and the impact of the policy on the relations between 
the United States and its Western European allies. The United States in-
sisted, on the basis of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949, that a highly 
integrated military structure be created. In the early 1950s the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, combining the military capabilities of the 
signatories came into existence. Because of its power, the United States 
not only was able to realize its objective of a highly integrated mili-
t ary force , but as well able to dominate the command structure and the 
strategy-formulation process. 
In time the American allies became less dependent upon the economic 
assistance provided by the United States . The Western Europeans rebuilt 
their ci ties, industries, and trade relations. Economic prosperity pro-
' duced more than material goods for the Western Europeans; economic well-
being encouraged them to become more independent vis-a-vis the United 
States ~ 
Technological development of weapons by the Soviet Union is also 
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responsible for European re-evaluation of relationships with the United 
States. The successful demonstration of the ballistic missile capability 
of the Soviet Union late in 1957 impressed the European states that the 
United States was vulnerable to Soviet nuclear missiles. This develop-
ment brought into sharp focus the question of reliability of the United 
States in the event of a conflict in security interests between the 
Western European allies and the United States. NATO possessed nuclear 
weapons, but these weapons were under the control of the United States. 
If the United States should decide to counter Soviet action by military 
means, there is nothing that its allies could do but follow. Similarly, 
should the American allies believe that a nuclear response was required 
and the United States differed in view, there would be little that they 
could do to effect this response. It is conceivable that under these 
conditions their security might be jeopardized. Even though nuclear 
weapons might not be involved, the United States, because of its domin-
ance of the command structure of NATO, could direct the NATO forces in 
such a way that the European partners' interests might not be fully 
· served. 
The French, who provide the major example of resistance to NATO in 
this study, have indicated by their policies and actions that they are 
unwilling to risk their security under conditions imposed by the NATO 
integrated military system. France, as a result, has embarked upon the 
development of a security system independent of the NATO system. The 
French leadership has insisted that the West European states must pro-
vide for their own security and not rely completely upon the United 
States. With respect to the current international environment in which 
a relaxation of tensions between the Soviet Union and Western Europe 
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seems to be taking place, the French leadership has concluded that the 
present NATO structure is too inflexible to exploit this condition in the 
French interest~ 
While France has rejected the tightly integrated military structure 
that has evolved since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, it has 
not renounced the treaty provisions requiring member nations to come to 
the assistance of each other if an aggression is committed. France in-
sists, however, that each nation must be free to decide for itself what 
action it will . take . The integrated structure violates that freedom of 
choice provided for in Article 5 of the Treaty. 1 
There are indications that other nations in the alliance structure 
have been frustrated with the integrated military system as well. While 
the official policies of Germany have continually supported the NATO 
military system, there are indications that some political leaderships 
are responding to the same problems that led to the withdrawal of France. 
It is the conclusion of this study that American policies requiring 
a tightly structured alliance system, with the United States dominating 
the command structure and the strategy-formulation process, have result-
ed in the breakdown of formal military coordination among the members of 
NATO . Assuming that the United States values formal military coordina-
tion as a major part of its security system, policies will have to be 
lThe parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them 
in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them 
all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, 
each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-
defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking forthwith, indivi-
dually and in concert with the other parties, such action as it deems 
necessary, including the use of armed forces, to restore and maintain 
the security of the North Atlantic area . 
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devised to meet the objections of the Eruopean partners. France is the 
only state to have withdrawn from the structured military system to date, 
but the likelihood of others doing so under present conditions of world 
politics is possible. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
/, Adenauer, Konrad. Konrad Adenauer Memiors 1945-53. Beate Ruhm von 
Oppen, tr. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1965. 
';) . Andreyev, N. "NATO's Role in Europe." Survival. Vol 8 (May, 1966), 
pp. 15G-5 5. 
:=;:, Aron, Robert. ~ Explanation of De Gaulle. Marianne Sinclair, tr. 
New York: Harper and Row, 1966. 
I.,! Ball, Margaret M. ~~~European Union Movement. New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. 
Baltzly, Alexander and A. William Salome, eds. Readings in Twentieth-
Century European History. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 
1950 . 
Barnet, Richard J. and Marcus G. Raskin. After 20 Years, Alternates to 
~~War in Europe. New York: Random House, 1965. 
Battersby, Roy. "French Eyes on the Future." Survival. Vol. 7 (Septem-
ber, 1965), pp. 219-23. 
Birrenbach, Kurt. ~ Future of~ Atlantic Community. New York, 
Ldndon : Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963. 
Brodie, Bernard. Strategy in~ Missile Age. Princeton, New Jersey : 
Princeton University Press, 1959. 
Buchan, Alastair. 
1960. 
NATO in the 1960s. 
------
New York: Frederick A. Prager, 
Claude, Inis L. Jr. Swords Into Plowshares The Problems and Progress of 
International Organizat'I"ori7 New York : Random House,-yg"56. 
Connery, Robert H. and Paul T. David. "The Mutual Defense Assistance 
Program." The American Political Science Review. Vol. 45 (June, 
1951), pp. 321- 47. 
Cottrell, Alvin J. and James E. Dougherty. The Politi cs of the Atlantic 
Alliance. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, London: The Pall Mall 
Press, Ltd., 1964. 
Crabb, Cecil V., Jr . American Foreign Policy in~ Nuclear Age, Princi-
ples, Problems,~ Prospects. Evanston, Illinois and Elmsford, 
New York: Row, Peterson and Company, 1960. 
80 
De Gaulle, Charles. Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences 
~ General Charles ~ Gaulle May l:2_, 1958--January ~, 1964. 
York: French Embassy, Press and Information Service, 19~ 
Drummond, Roscoe. "Contagious Nationalism." The Christian Science 
Monitor (December 5, 1966), p. 18. 
81 
Erler, Fritz. "The Alliance and the Future of Germany." Foreign Affairs. 
Vol. 43 (April, 1965), pp. 436-46. 
Furniss, Edgar s. Jr. France Troubled Ally,£!:. Gaulle's Heritage and 
Prospects. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960. 
Hilsman, Roger. "NATO: The Developing Strategic Context." NATO and 
American Security. Klaus Knorr, ed~ Princeton, New Jersey:-i>"rince-
ton University Press, 1959. 
Kennan, George F. American Diplomacy 1900-1950. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1951. 
Kissinger, Henry A. 
Foreign Policy. 
~Necessity~ Choice, Prospects of American 
New York: Harper and Brothers, 1961. 
!!:!!:_ Troubled Partnership, A Re-appraisal of ~ 
Atlantic Community. New York, London, Toronto: McGraw Hill Book 
Company, 1965. 
Khayyam, Omar. Rubaiyat of~ Khayyam. Edward Fitzgerald, tr. New 
York : The Heritage Press, 1946. 
Knappen, Marshall. An Introduction to American Foreign Policy. New 
York : Harper ancr-Brothers, 1956-.-
Langsam 9 Walter Consuelo. The World Since 1919. New York: The MacMil-
lan Company, 1954. 
Lowenstein, Prince Hubertus zu and Volkmar von Zuhlsdorff. NATO and 
the Defense of the West. Edward Fitzgerald, tr. New York:Freder-
ick A. Praeger, 196~ 
Macridis, Roy C. De Gaulle Implacable Ally . New York: Harper and Row, 
Inc., 1966. 
McNamara, Robert S. "The Limitations of Military Power." Survival. 
Vol. 8 (July, 1966), pp. 210-16. 
Moore, Ben T. NATO and the Future of Europe. New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1958. - -
Morgenthau, Hans J. 
El_.f;!.~ ~· 
Press, 1959. 
"Alliances in Theory and Practice." Alliance Poli-
Arnold Wolfers, ed. Baltimore: The John Hopkins"°" 
"Germany Gives Rise to Vast Uncertainties." The New 
York Times Magazine (September 8, 1963), pp. 21-3. 
Mulley, F. W. The Politics of Western Defense. New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1962. 
Munk, Frank. Atlantic Dilemma: Partnership~ Community. Dobbs Ferry, 
New York: Oceana Publication, Inc., 1964. 
82 
NATO Letter. Vol. 14, No. 5. Paris: North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
Information Service (May, 1966). 
The New York Times. New York, 1948, 1949, 1959. 
Osgood, Robert Endicott. NATO the Entangling Alliance. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago"'1iresS:-Toronto: The University of Toronto 
Press, 1962. 
Pompidou, Georges. Full Texts of the Statements~ Foreign Policy~ 
Georges.Pompidou13efore the French National Assembly on April 13 
~April 3..2,., 1966. New York: Ambassade de France, Service de~ 
Presse et d'Information, 1966. 
Rathjens, George w. ,Jr. "NATO Strategy: Total War." NATO and American 
Security. Klaus Knorr, ed. Princeton, New Jersey: 1959. 
Richardson, James L. Germany and the Atlantic Alliance, The Interaction 
~ Strategy and Politics.--"'cambridge, Massachusetts:"""'iiarvard Univer-
sity Press, 1966. 
Robertson, A.H. 
Unification. 
European Institutions, Co-operation: Integration: 
New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. 
Schuman, Robert. "France and Europe." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 9, (April, 
1953), pp. 332-45. 
Sokolovskii, V. D. Soviet Military Strategy. Herbert S. Dinerstein 
and others, trs. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
Inc., 1963. 
Sommer, Theo. "For an Atlantic Future." Foreign Affairs. Vol. 43 
(October, 1964), pp. 112-25. 
Stanley, Timothy w. NATO in Transition: The Future of the Atlantic Al-
liance. New York:""""frederick A. Praeger, 1965. ~-
Steele, Ronald. The End of Alliance: America and the Future. New York: 
The Viking Press 7"°f 964. - -
Treaty Series. Vol. 210. New York: Secretariat of the United Nations, 
1955. 
83 
United States Congress. The Crisis in NATO. Hearings Before the 
Subcommittee on Europ;--of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 
Congress, 2nd session. Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
1966. 
House 
89th 
Office, 
United States Department of State. ~ Department ~ State Bulletin. 
Vol. 16. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947. 
The Department of State Bulletin. Vol. 17. Wash-
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947. 
~Department~ State Bulletin. Vol. 20. Wash-
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949. 
!!!.:_ Department ~ State Bulletin. Vol. 26. Wash-
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1952. 
The Department of State Bulletin. Vol. 28. Wash-
ington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953. 
Foreign Relations .2;t~ United States Diplomatic Papers. Vol. 2. 
Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960. 
"NATO Without France--De Gaulle Forces U.S. to Showdown in Europe." u. 
,2.• ~~World Report, Vol. 63 (March 21, 1966), pp. 44-46. 
"Tirt.e to Start U.S. Pullback in Europe?" U.S. News and World Report. 
Vol. 63 (April 18, 1966), pp. 68-72.- --
United States Statutes at Large. Vol. 63, Part 2 Washington: U.S. 
Government PrintingOffice, 1950. 
Willis, F. Roy: France, Germany, ~nd t~e.~ Europe 1945-1963. Stan-
ford, California: Stanford University Press, London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1965. 
TEXT or THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
PREAMl3LE. The parties to this treaty reaffirm their faith in the 
purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their 
desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. 
They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and 
civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, 
individual liberty and the rule of law. 
They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic 
area . 
They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and 
for the preservation of peace and security. 
They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty: 
ARTICLE 1. The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the 
United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may 
be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace 
and security, and justice, are not endangered, and to refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner in-
consistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
ARTICLE 2. The parties will contribute toward the further develop-
ment of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening 
their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the 
principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting 
conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate 
conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage 
economic collaboration between any or all of them, 
ARTICLE 3. In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of 
this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous 
and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their 
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. 
ARTICLE 4. The parties will cdnsult together whenever, in the opin-
ion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or 
security of any of the parties is threatened. 
ARTICLE s. The parties agree that an armed attack against one or 
more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack 
against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed 
attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or 
collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the 
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United Nations, will assist the party or parties so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other parties, such 
action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to re-
store and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof 
shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures 
shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures 
necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. 
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ARTICLE 6. For the purpose of Article 5 an armed attack on one or 
more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the terri-
tory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian 
Departments of France, on the occupation forces of any party in Europe, 
on the islands under the jurisdiction of any party in the North Atlantic 
area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this 
area of any of the parties. 
ART ICLE 7 . This treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpre-
t ed as af fecting, i n any way the rights and obligations under the Char-
ter of the parties which are members of the United Nations, or the prim-
ary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security . 
ARTICLE 8. Each party declares that none of the international engage-
ments now in force between it and any other of the parties or any third 
state is in conflict with the provisions of this treaty, and undertakes 
not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this 
treaty . 
ARTICLE 9. The parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of 
them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implemen-
tation of this treaty. The Council shall be so organized as to be able 
t o meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such subsidiary 
bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately 
a defense committee which shall recommend measures for the implementa-
tion of Articles 3 ands. 
ART ICLE 10 . The parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any 
other European state in a position to further the principles of this 
treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to 
accede to this treaty. Any state so invited may become a party to the 
treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of 
the United States of America . The Government of the United States of 
America will inform each of the parties of the deposit of each such 
i nstrument of accession . 
ARTICLE 11. This treaty shall be ratified and its provisions car-
ried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitu-
tional processes . The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as 
soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, 
which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit~ The Treaty 
shall enter into force between the states which have ratified it as soon 
as the ratifications of the majority of the signatories, including the 
ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
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the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and shall 
come into effect with respect to other states on the date of the deposit 
of their ratifications. 
ARTICLE 12. After the treaty has been in force for ten years, or at 
any time thereafter, the parties shall, if any of them so requests, con-
sult together for the purpose of reviewing the treaty, having regard for 
the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, 
including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements 
under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security. 
ARTICLE 13. After the treaty has been in force for twenty years, 
any party may cease to be a party one year after its notice of denunci-
ation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, 
which will inform the Governments of the other parties of the deposit of 
each notice of denunciation. 
ARTICLE 14. This treaty, of which the English and French texts are 
equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government 
of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof will be 
transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signa-
tories. 
Source: United States Statutes~ Large. Vol. 63, Part 2 (Washington, 
1950), pp. 2241-48. 
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